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Preface 
 
 
This project work mainly contains the Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a 
large Nuclear Power Plant. The Nuclear Power Plant discussed in this report contains 
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). 
The Modular design scheme of PWR Nuclear Power Plant provides the redundancy to 
prevent the any common failure. Passive Safety System is Striking feature of this PWR 
Nuclear Power Plant which removes the decay heat when station blackout occurs. As the 
safety is very important issue in any nuclear power plant, Passive Safety System and 
Redundant System of plant provides the better safety for plant called as Defense in Depth. 
We, have involved in this project, have worked with commitment right from initialization 
of the project and continuing all the way till its completion. 
It may contain little errors, as there is always a scope for improvement. 
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INTRODUCTION OF PWR NULEAR POWER PLANT 
 
There have been a considerable number of nuclear reactor concepts proposed over the thirty 
years of applied nuclear power. A selected number of these have been developed to the extent 
that one or more plants have been built. Today, only three of these concepts are considered 
commercially viable. Two of these concepts are based on the use of uranium enriched in the 
isotope U-235 with light (or ordinary) water employed for cooling and neutron moderation. Of 
these two concepts, one is the pressurized water reactor or PWR developed by Westinghouse. 
The other is the boiling water reactor or BWR developed by General Electric. The third concept 
is based on the use of natural uranium with heavy-water (water enriched in the deuterium 
isotope) for cooling and moderation. This reactor concept has been principally developed and 
applied by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.  
 
Worldwide, of the over 400 nuclear power plants operating or under construction, over 75 
percent of these are of the light-water design with over 65 percent of the light-water plants being 
PWRs furnished by Westinghouse and its current or original licensees. The fundamental 
distinction between the PWR and the BWR is that in the latter the coolant moderator is allowed 
to boil with the resulting steam passed directly to the turbine-generator, whereas in the PWR the 
coolant moderator is maintained above saturation pressure such that no significant amount of 
boiling occurs in the reactor. The necessary steam for the turbine generator is produced in a 
steam generator where the reactor heat is transferred to a secondary water coolant at lower 
pressure. There are of course a considerable number of other less fundamental differences as 
well.  
 
The importance of these differences has been examined in a large number of utility evaluations 
with the clearest and simplest overall result being the current commercial dominance of the PWR 
design. This document describes the basic design and operating characteristics of a 
Westinghouse PWR plant. The design is available in five ratings of approximately 600 
megawatts electrical (MWe), 900 MWe, 1000 MWe, 1100 MWe, and 1200 MWe. (The exact 
ratings of course reflect a number of specific constraints such as heat sink characteristics.) The 
different ratings are attained through use of either two, three or four reactor coolant piping loops, 
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each loop comprised of a steam generator, reactor coolant pump, or interconnecting piping. The 
loops are each connected to a reactor vessel sized to contain nuclear cores comprised of fuel 
elements of either 12 or 14 foot length with from121 to 193 assemblies. 
 
 In this manner the full range of utility requirements can be satisfied while maximizing the use of 
standard components The description given in this document is based on a four-loop plant with a 
twelve foot core (a Model 412 plant) having an electrical capacity of some 1100 MWe. The 
descriptions generally apply equally to the other ratings when proper consideration is given to 
the number of reactor coolant loops and/or core length. For all ratings, the functional system 
requirements and operating characteristics are essentially the same. Where system or plant 
operation is described, the actions and sequences are based on current Westinghouse 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a large Nuclear Power Plant 
 
AIKTC Page 3 
 
PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR DESIGN CONCEPT 
 
A simplified schematic of the Westinghouse PWR plant design is shown in Figure 1-1. The total 
power cycle may be considered to be comprised of three generally independent closed cycles or 
loops: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The primary loop contains the heat source consisting of a 
nuclear fuel core positioned within a reactor vessel where the energy resulting from the 
controlled fission reaction is transformed into sensible heat in the coolant moderator. The coolant 
is pumped to the steam generator where the heat is transferred to a secondary loop through a 
number of U-type tubes. The reactor coolant then returns back to the reactor vessel to continue 
the process. An electrically heated pressurizes connected to the loop maintains a pressure above 
the saturation pressure so that bulk boiling does not occur. The secondary loop is the heat 
utilization circuit where dry steam produced in the steam generator flows to a turbine-generator 
where it is expanded to convert thermal energy into mechanical energy and hence electrical 
energy .The expanded steam exhausts to a condenser where the latent heat of vaporization is 
transferred to the cooling system and is condensed. The condensate is pumped back to the steam 
generator to continue the cycle. 
 
The tertiary loop is the heat rejection loop where the latent heat of vaporization is rejected to the 
environment through the condenser cooling water. Depending on the specific site, this heat is 
released to a river, lake, ocean, or cooling tower system with the latter becoming the more 
Common within the United States. Use of a steam generator to separate the primary loop from 
the secondary loop largely confines the radioactive materials to a single building during normal 
power operation and eliminates the extensive turbine maintenance problems that would result 
from radioactively contaminated steam. For general discussion purposes, a nuclear power plant 
can be considered to be made up of two major areas: a nuclear island and a turbine island. These 
are described below. Each is comprised of fluid, electrical, instrumentation and control systems; 
electrical and mechanical components; and the buildings or structures housing them. There are 
also a number of shared fluids, electrical, instrumentation and control systems, as well as other 
areas of interconnection or interface. 
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CHAPTER1 
 
1 PWR Nuclear Power Plant Analysis 
 
1.1 AC Power System 
The onsite ac power system is a non-Class 1E system comprised of a normal, preferred, 
maintenance and standby power supplies. The normal, preferred, and maintenance power 
supplies are included in the main ac power system. The standby power is included in the onsite 
standby power system. The Class 1E and non-Class 1E 208/120 Vac instrumentation power 
supplies as a part of uninterruptible power supply in the dc power systems.  
 
1.1.1 Onsite AC Power System  
 The main ac power system is a non-Class 1E system and does not perform any safety-
related functions. It has nominal bus voltage ratings of 6.9 kV, 480 V, 277 V, 208 V, and 120 V.   
  During power generation mode, the turbine generator normally supplies electric power to 
the plant auxiliary loads through the unit auxiliary transformers. The plant is designed to sustain 
a load rejection from 100 percent power with the turbine generator continuing stable operation 
while supplying the plant house loads. The load rejection feature does not perform any safety 
function.  
  During plant startup, shutdown, and maintenance the generator breaker remains open. 
The main ac power is provided by the preferred power supply from the high-voltage switchyard 
(switchyard voltage is site-specific) through the plant main step-up transformers and two unit 
auxiliary transformers. Each unit auxiliary transformer supplies power to about 50 percent of the 
plant loads.  
  A maintenance source is provided to supply power through two reserve auxiliary 
transformers.  
  The maintenance source and the associated reserve auxiliary transformers primary 
voltage are site specific. The reserve auxiliary transformers are sized so that it can be used in 
place of the unit auxiliary transformers. 
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  The two unit auxiliary transformers have two identically rated 6.9 kV secondary 
windings. The third unit auxiliary transformer is a two winding transformer sized to 
accommodate the electric boiler and site-specific loads. Secondary’s of the auxiliary 
transformers are connected to the 6.9 kV switchgear buses by no segregated phase buses.  
 
The primary of the unit auxiliary transformer is connected to the main generator isolated phase 
bus duct tap. The 6.9 kV switchgear designation, location, connection, and connected loads are 
shown in. The buses tagged with odd numbers (ES1, ES3, etc.) are connected to one unit 
auxiliary transformer and the buses tagged with even numbers (ES2, ES4, etc.) are connected to 
the other unit auxiliary transformer.  
 
ES7 is connected to the third unit auxiliary transformer. 6.9 kV buses ES1-ES6 are provided with 
an access to the maintenance source through normally open circuit breakers connecting the bus 
to the reserve auxiliary transformer. ES7 is not connected to the maintenance source. Bus 
transfer to the maintenance source is manual or automatic through a fast bus transferscheme. 
 
The arrangement of the 6.9 kV buses permits feeding functionally redundant pumps or groups of 
loads from separate buses and enhances the plant operational flexibility. The 6.9 kV switchgear 
powers large motors and the load center transformers. There are two switchgear (ES1 and ES2) 
located in the annex building, and five (ES3, ES4, ES5, ES6, and ES7) in the turbine building.  
The main step up transformers have protective devices for sudden pressure, neutral overcurrent, 
and differential current. The unit auxiliary transformers have protective devices for sudden 
pressure, overcurrent, differential current, and neutral overcurrent. The isophase bus duct has 
ground fault protection. If these devices sense a fault condition the following actions will be 
automatically taken: 
  Trip high-side (grid) breaker 
  Trip generator breaker 
  Trip exciter field breaker 
  Trip the 6.9 kV buses connected to the faulted transformer 
  Initiate a fast bus transfer of ES1-ES6 6.9kV buses ES1-ES6. 
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The reserve auxiliary transformers have protective devices for sudden pressure, overcurrent, and 
differential current and neutral overcurrent. The reserve auxiliary transformers protective devices 
trip the reserve supply breaker and any 6.9 kV buses connected to the reserve auxiliary 
transformers.  
 
The onsite standby power system powered by the two onsite standby diesel generators supplies 
power to selected loads in the event of loss of normal, and preferred ac power supplies followed 
by a fast bus transfer to the reserve auxiliary transformers. Those loads that are priority loads for 
defense-in-depth functions based on their specific functions (permanent nonsafety loads) are 
assigned to buses ES1 and ES2.  
 
These plant permanent nonsafety loads are divided into two functionally redundant load groups 
(degree of redundancy for each load is described in the sections for the respective systems). Each 
load group is connected to either bus ES1 or ES2. Each bus is backed by a non-Class 1E onsite 
standby diesel generator. In the event of a loss of voltage on these buses, the diesel generators 
are automatically started and connected to the respective buses.  
 
In the event where a fast bus transfer initiates but fails to complete, the diesel generator will 
start on an under voltage signal; however, if a successful residual voltage transfer occurs, the 
diesel generator will not be connected to the bus because the successful residual voltage transfer 
will provide power to the bus before the diesel connection time of 2 minutes. The source 
incoming breakers on switchgear ES1 and ES2 are interlocked to prevent inadvertent connection 
of the onsite standby diesel generator and preferred/maintenance ac power sources to the 6.9 kV 
buses at the same time. 
 
 The diesel generator, however, is capable of being manually paralleled with the preferred or 
reserve power supply for periodic testing. Design provisions protect the diesel generators from 
excessive loading beyond the design maximum rating, should the preferred power be lost during 
periodic testing.  
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The control scheme, while protecting the diesel generators from excessive loading, does not 
compromise the onsite power supply capabilities to support the defense-in-depth loads. The 480 
V load centers supply power to selected 460 V motor loads and to motor control centers. Bus tie 
breakers are provided between two 480 V load centers each serving predominantly redundant 
loads. This intertie allows restoration of power to selected loads in the event of a failure or 
maintenance of a single load center transformer.  
 
The bus tie breakers are interlocked with the corresponding bus source incoming breakers so that 
one of the two bus source incoming breakers must be opened before the associated tie breaker is 
closed. Load center, associated with ES-7, does not have an equivalent match. The 480 V motor 
control centers supply power to 460 V motors not powered directly from load centers, while the 
480/277 V, and 208/120 V distribution panels provide power for miscellaneous loads such as 
unit heaters, space heaters, and lighting system. The motor control centers also provide ac power 
to the Class 1E battery chargers for the Class 1E dc power system 
 
 
 
1.1.2 Electric Circuit Protection 
 
Protective relay schemes and direct acting trip devices on circuit breakers: 
 Provide safety of personnel 
  Minimize damage to equipment 
  Minimize system disturbances 
  Isolate faulted equipment and circuits from unfaulted equipment and circuits 
  Maintain (selected) continuity of the power supply  Major types of protection systems 
employed for AP1000 include the following: 
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1.1.3 Medium Voltage Switchgear Differential Relaying 
 
Each medium voltage switchgear bus is provided with a bus differential relay to protect against a 
bus fault. The actuation of this relay initiates tripping of the source incoming circuit breaker and 
all branch circuit load breakers. The differential protection scheme employs 
High speed relays. Motors rated 1500 hp and above are generally provided with a high dropout 
overcurrent relay for differential protection. 
 
 
1.1.4 Over current Relaying 
 
To provide backup protection for the buses, the source incoming circuit breakers are equipped 
with an inverse time overcurrent protection on each phase and a residually connected inverse 
time ground overcurrent protection. Each medium voltage motor feeder breaker is equipped with 
a motor protection relay which provides protection against various types of faults (phase and 
ground) and abnormal conditions such as locked rotor and phase unbalance. Motor overload 
condition is annunciated in the main control room. Each medium voltage power feeder to a 480 
V load center has a multifunction relay. The relay provides overcurrent protection on each phase 
for short circuit and overload, and an instantaneous overcurrent protection for ground fault. 
 
 
1.1.5 Under voltage Relaying 
 
Medium voltage buses are provided with a set of three under voltage relays which trip motor 
feeder circuit breakers connected to the bus upon loss of bus voltage using two-out-of three logic 
to prevent spurious actuation. In addition, a protective device is provided on the line side of 
incoming supply breakers of buses ES1 and ES2 to initiate an alarm in the main control room if a 
sustained low or high voltage condition occurs on the utility supply system. The alarm is 
provided so that the operator can take appropriate corrective measures. 
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1.1.6 480-V Load Centers 
Each motor-feeder breaker in load centers is equipped with a trip unit which has long time, 
instantaneous, and ground fault tripping features. Overload condition of motors is annunciated in 
the main control room. 
The circuit breakers feeding the 480V motor control centers and other   
time, short time, and ground fault tripping features. Each load center bus has an under voltage 
relay which initiates an alarm in the main control room upon loss of bus voltage. Load center 
transformers have transformer winding temperature relays which give an alarm on transformer 
overload. 
 
1.1.7 480-V Motor Control Center 
Motor control center feeders for low-voltage (460 V) motors have molded case circuit breakers 
(magnetic or motor circuit protectors) and motor starters. Motor starters are provided with 
thermal units (overload heaters) or current sensors. Other feeders have molded case circuit 
breakers with thermal and magnetic trip elements for overload and short circuit protection. Non-
Class 1E ac motor-operated valves are protected by thermal overload devices. Thermal overload 
devices are selected and sized so as to provide the necessary protection while minimizing 
the probability of spurious interruptions of valve actuation. 
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1.1.8 Standby AC Power Supply 
 
1.1.8.1 Onsite Standby Diesel Generators 
 
Two onsite standby diesel generator units, each furnished with its own support subsystems, 
provide power to the selected plant non safety-related ac loads. Power supplies to each diesel 
generator subsystem components are provided from separate sources to maintain reliability and 
operability of the onsite standby power system. These onsite standby diesel generator units and 
their associated support systems are classified as AP1000 Class D, defense-in-depth systems. 
The onsite standby diesel generator function to provide a backup source of electrical power to 
Onsite equipment needed to support decay heat removal operation during reduced reactor coolant 
system inventory, mid loop, operation is identified as an important non safety-related function 
each diesel generator unit is an independent self-contained system complete with necessary 
support subsystems that include: 
 
 Diesel engine starting subsystem 
 Combustion air intake and engine exhaust subsystem 
 Engine cooling subsystem 
 Engine lubricating oil subsystem 
 Engine speed control subsystem 
 Generator, exciter, generator protection, monitoring instruments, and controls subsystems 
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1.1.8.2 Ancillary ac Diesel Generators 
 
Power for Class 1E post-accident monitoring, MCR lighting, MCR and divisions B and C I&C 
room ventilation and for refilling the PCS water storage tank and the spent fuel pool when no 
other sources of power are available is provided by two ancillary ac diesel generators located in 
the annex building. The ancillary generators are not needed for refilling the PCS water storage 
tank, spent fuel pool makeup, post-accident monitoring or lighting for the first 72 hours 
following a loss of all other ac sources. 
The fuel for the ancillary generators is stored in a tank located in the same room as the 
generators. The fuel tank, piping, and valves are analyzed to show that they withstand an SSE. 
The tank includes provisions for venting to the outside atmosphere and for refilling from a truck 
or other mobile source of fuel. The tank is seismic Category II and holds sufficient fuel for 4 
days of operation. 
 
Temporary Electric Power One Line Diagram 
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1.1.8.3 Onsite Standby Power System Performance 
 
The onsite standby power system provides reliable ac power to the various plant system 
electrical loads shown these loads represent system components that enhance an orderly plant 
shutdown under emergency conditions.  
 
Additional loads that are for investment protection can be manually loaded on the standby power 
supply after the loads required for orderly shutdown have been satisfied. The values listed in the 
"Operating Load (kW)". Both the diesel engine and the associated generator are rated based on 
104°F ambient temperature at 1000 ft elevation as standard site conditions. 
 
 The selected unit rating has a design margin to accommodate possible de rating resulting from 
other site conditions. The diesel generator unit is able to reach the rated speed and voltage and be 
ready to accept electrical loads within 120 seconds after a start signal. Each generator has an 
automatic load sequencer to enable controlled loading on the generator. The automatic load 
sequencer connects selected loads at predetermined intervals. This feature allows recuperation of 
generator voltage and frequency to rated values prior to the connection of the next load. 
 
To enable periodic testing, each generator has synchronizing equipment at a local panel as well 
as in the main control room. 
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1.1.9 Electrical Equipment Layout 
 
The main ac power system distributes ac power to the reactor, turbine, and balance of plant 
(BOP) auxiliary electrical loads for startup, normal operation, and normal/emergency shutdown. 
The medium voltage switchgear ES1 and ES2 are located in the electrical switchgear rooms 1 
and 2 of the annex building. The incoming power is supplied from the unit auxiliary transformers 
ET2A and ET2B (X windings) via non segregated buses.  
 
The non segregated buses are routed from the transformer yard to the annex building in the most 
direct path practical. The switchgear ES3, ES4, ES5, and ES6 are located in the turbine building 
electrical switchgear rooms. The incoming power is supplied from the unit auxiliary transformers 
ET2A and ET2B  (Y windings) via non segregated buses to ES3 and ES4 and from ET2A and 
ET2B (X windings) to ES5 and ES6. Switchgear ES7 is located in the auxiliary boiler room in 
the turbine building.  
 
The Class 1E medium voltage circuit breakers, ES31, ES32, ES41, ES42, ES51, ES52, ES61, 
and ES62, for four reactor coolant pumps are located in the auxiliary building. The 480 V load 
centers are located in the turbine building electrical switchgear rooms 1 and 2 and in the annex 
building electrical switchgear rooms 1 and 2 based on the proximity of loads and the associated 
6.9 kV switchgear. 
 
 Load center 71 is located in the auxiliary boiler room in the turbine building. The 480 V motor 
control centers are located throughout the plant to effectively distribute power to electrical loads. 
The load centers and motor control centers are free standing with top or bottom cable entry and 
front access. The number of stacks/cubicles varies for each location. 
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AC Power Station Single Line Diagram  
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1.1.10 Grounding System 
The grounding system consists of the following 
Four subsystems: 
  Station grounding grid 
  System grounding 
  Equipment grounding 
  Instrument/computer grounding 
 
The station grounding grid subsystem consists of buried, interconnected bare copper conductors 
and ground rods (Copper weld) forming a plant ground grid matrix. The subsystem will maintain 
a uniform ground potential and limit the step-and-touch potentials to safe values under all fault 
conditions. 
 
The system grounding subsystem provides grounding of the neutral points of the main generator, 
main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, and onsite standby 
Diesel generators. The main and diesel generator neutrals will be grounded through grounding 
transformers providing high-impedance grounding. The main step-up and load center 
transformer Neutrals will be grounded solidly.  
 
The auxiliary (unit and reserve) transformer secondary winding neutrals will be resistance 
grounded. The equipment grounding subsystem provides grounding of the equipment enclosures, 
metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, MCCs, and 
control Cabinets with two ground connections to the station ground grid. The 
instrument/computer grounding subsystem provides plant instrument/computer grounding 
through separate radial grounding systems consisting of isolated instrumentation ground buses 
and Insulated cables. The radial grounding systems are connected to the station grounding grid at 
one point only and are insulated from all other grounding circuits. 
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1.1.11 Lightning Protection 
 
The lightning protection system, consisting of air terminals and ground conductors, will be 
provided for the protection of exposed structures and buildings housing safety-related and fire 
protection equipment in accordance with NFPA 780.Also, lightning arresters are provided in 
each phase of the transmission lines and at the high-voltage terminals of the outdoor 
transformers.  
 
The isophase bus connecting the main generator and the main transformer and the medium-
voltage switchgear is provided with lightning arresters. In addition, surge suppressors are 
provided to protect the plant instrumentation and monitoring system from lightning-induced 
surges in the signal and power cables connected to devices located outside.  
 
Direct-stroke lightning protection for facilities is accomplished by providing a low-impedance 
path by which the lightning stroke discharge can enter the earth directly. The direct-stroke 
lightning protection system, consisting of air terminals, interconnecting cables, and down 
conductors to ground, are provided external to the facility in accordance with the guidelines 
included in NFPA 780.  
 
The system is connected directly to the station ground to facilitate dissipation of the large current 
of a direct lightning stroke. The lightning arresters and the surge suppressors connected directly 
to ground provide a low-impedance path to ground for the surges caused or induced by lightning. 
Thus, fire or damage to facilities and equipment resulting from a lightning stroke is avoided. 
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1.1.12 Inspection and Testing 
 
Preoperational tests are conducted to verify proper operation of the ac power system. The 
preoperational tests include operational testing of the diesel load sequencer and diesel generator 
capacity testing. 
 
 
 
1.1.12.1 Diesel Load Sequencer Operational Testing 
 
The load sequencer for each standby diesel generator is tested to verify that it produces the 
appropriate sequencing signals within five (5) seconds of the times The five second margin is 
sufficient for proper diesel generator transient response. 
 
 
 
1.1.12.2 Standby Diesel Generator Capacity Testing 
 
Each standby diesel generator is tested to verify the capability to provide 4000 kW while 
maintaining the output voltage and frequency within the design tolerances of 6900±10% Vac and 
60±5% Hz. The 4000 kW capacity is sufficient to meet the loads The test duration will be the 
time required to reach engine temperature equilibrium plus 2.5 hours. This duration is sufficient 
to demonstrate long-term capability. 
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1.2 DC Power Systems 
 
 Description 
 
The plant dc power system is comprised of independent Class 1E and non-Class 1E dc power 
systems. Each system consists of ungrounded stationary batteries, dc distribution equipment, and 
uninterruptible power supply (UPS).  
 
The Class 1E dc and UPS system provides reliable power for the safety-related equipment 
required for the plant instrumentation, control, monitoring, and other vital functions needed for 
shutdown of the plant. In addition, the Class 1E dc and UPS system provides power to the 
normal and emergency lighting in the main control room and at the remote shutdown 
workstation. 
 
 The Class 1E dc and UPS system is capable of providing reliable power for the safe shutdown of 
the plant without the support of battery chargers during a loss of all ac power sources coincident 
with a design basis accident (DBA).  
 
The system is designed so that no single failure will result in a condition that will prevent the 
safe shutdown of the plant. The non-Class 1E dc and UPS system provides continuous, reliable 
electric power to the plant non-Class 1E control and instrumentation loads and equipment that 
are required for plant operation and investment protection and to the hydrogen igniters located 
inside containment. Operation of the non-Class 1E dc and UPS system is not required for nuclear 
safety. 
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1.2.1 Class 1E DC and UPS System 
 
1.2.1.1 Class 1E DC Distribution 
 
The Class 1E dc components are housed in seismic Category I structures. For system 
configuration and equipment rating, see Class 1E dc one-line diagram, Nominal ratings of 
major Class 1E dc equipment There are four independent, Class 1E 250 Vdc divisions, A, B, 
C, and D. Divisions A and D are each comprising one battery bank, one switchboard, and one 
battery charger. 
 
 The battery bank is connected to Class 1E dc switchboard through a set of fuses and a 
disconnect switch. Divisions B and C are each composed of two battery banks, two 
switchboards, and two battery chargers. The first battery bank in the four divisions, 
designated as 24-hour battery bank, provides power to the loads required for the first 24 
hours following an event of loss of all ac power sources concurrent with a design basis 
accident (DBA).  
 
The second battery bank in divisions B and C, designated as 72-hour battery bank, is used for 
those loads requiring power for 72 hours following the same event. Each switchboard 
connected with a 24-hour battery bank supplies power to an inverter, a 250 Vdc distribution 
panel, and a 250 Vdc motor control center. 
 
 Each switchboard connected with a 72-hour battery bank supplies power to an inverter. No 
load shedding or load management program is needed to maintain power during the required 
24-hour safety actuation period. A single spare battery bank with a spare battery charger is 
provided for the Class 1E dc and UPS system.  
 
In the case of a failure or unavailability of the normal battery bank and the battery charger, 
permanently installed cable connections allow the spare to be connected to the affected bus 
by plug-in locking type disconnect along with kirk-key interlock switches.  
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The plug-in locking type disconnect and kirk-key interlock switches permit connection of 
only one battery bank and battery charger at a time so that the independence of each battery 
division is preserved.  
 
The spare battery and the battery charger can also be utilized as a substitute when offline 
testing, maintenance, and equalization of an operational battery bank are desired. Each 
battery bank, including the spare, has a battery monitor system that detects battery open 
circuit conditions and monitors battery voltage.  
 
The battery monitor provides a trouble alarm in the main control room. The battery monitors 
are not required to support any safety-related function. Monitoring and alarming of dc current 
and voltages are through the plant control system which includes a battery discharge rate 
alarm. AP1000 generally uses fusible disconnect switches in the Class 1E dc system.  
 
If molded-case circuit breakers are used for dc applications, they will be sized to meet the dc 
interrupting rating requirements. The Class 1E dc switchboards employ fusible disconnect 
switches and have adequate short circuit and continuous-current ratings. The main bus bars 
are braced to withstand mechanical forces resulting from a short-circuit current. Fused 
transfer switch boxes, equipped with double pole double throw transfer switches, are 
provided to facilitate battery testing, and maintenance 
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Class 1E DC System One Line Diagram 
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1.2.1.2 Class 1E Uninterruptible Power Supplies 
 
The Class 1E UPS provides power at 208 Y/120 Vac to four independent divisions of Class 
1E instrument and control power buses. Divisions A and D each consist of one Class 1E 
inverter associated with an instrument and control distribution panel and a backup voltage 
regulating transformer with a distribution panel.  
 
The inverter is powered from the respective 24-hour battery bank switchboard. Divisions B 
and C each consist of two inverters, two instrument and control distribution panels, and a 
voltage regulating transformer with a distribution panel. 
 
 One inverter is powered by the 24-hour battery bank switchboard and the other, by the 72-
hour battery bank switchboard. For system configuration and equipment rating. The nominal 
ratings of the Class 1E inverters and the voltage regulating transformers. Under normal 
operation, the Class 1E inverters receive power from the associated battery bank. If an 
inverter is inoperable or the Class 1E 250 Vdc input to the inverter is unavailable, the power 
is transferred automatically to the backup ac source by a static transfer switch featuring a 
make-before-break contact arrangement. 
 
 The backup power is received from the diesel generator backed non-Class 1E 480 Vac bus 
through the Class 1E voltage regulating transformer. In addition, a manual mechanical 
bypass switch is provided to allow connection of backup power source when the inverter is 
removed from service for maintenance. In order to supply power during the post-72-hour 
period following a design basis accident, provisions are made to connect a ancillary ac 
generator to the Class 1E voltage regulating transformers (divisions B and C only).  
 
This powers the Class 1E post-accident monitoring systems and the lighting in the main 
control room and ventilation in the MCR and divisions B and C I&C rooms.  The non-Class 
1E dc and UPS system consists of the electric power supply and distribution equipment that 
provide dc and uninterruptible ac power to the plant non-Class 1E dc and ac loads that are 
critical for plant operation and investment protection and to the hydrogen igniters located 
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inside containment. The non-class 1E dc and UPS system is comprised of two subsystems 
representing two separate power supply trains.  
 
The subsystems are located in separate rooms in the annex building each of the EDS1 and 3, 
and 2 and 4 subsystems consists of separate dc distribution buses. These two buses can be 
connected by a normally open circuit breaker to enhance the power supply source 
availability. Each dc subsystem includes battery chargers, stationary batteries, dc distribution 
equipment, and associated monitoring and protection devices. 
 
 DC buses 1, 2, 3, and provide 125 Vdc power to the associated inverter units that supply the 
ac power to the non-Class 1E uninterruptible power supply ac system. An alternate regulated 
ac power source for the UPS buses is supplied from the associated regulating transformers. 
DC bus 5 supplies large dc motors. This configuration isolates the large motors.  
 
The onsite standby diesel generator backed 480 Vac distribution system provides the normal 
ac power to the battery chargers. Industry standard stationary batteries that are similar to the 
Class 1E design are provided to supply the dc power source in case the battery chargers fail 
to supply the dc distribution bus system loads.  
 
The batteries are sized to supply the system loads for a period of at least two hours after loss 
of all ac power sources. The dc distribution switchboard houses the dc feeder protection 
device, dc bus ground fault detection, and appropriate metering.  
 
The component design and the current interrupting device selection follow the circuit 
coordination principles. Each of the EDS1 through 4 non-Class 1E dc distribution subsystem 
bus has provisions to allow the connection of a spare non-Class 1E battery charger should its 
non-Class 1E battery charger be unavailable due to maintenance, testing, or failure. EDS5 
does not require this capability because the only load on the charger is the battery.  
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The non-Class 1E dc system uses the Class 1E spare battery bank as a temporary replacement 
for any primary non-Class 1E battery bank. In this design configuration, the spare Class 1E 
battery bank would be connected to the non-Class 1E dc bus, but could not simultaneously 
supply Class 1E safety loads not perform safety-related functions.  
 
For EDS1 through EDS4, this is accomplished by opening the disconnect switch between the 
two 125 Vdc battery cell strings, which together, comprise the 250 Vdc spare battery. 
Additionally, the design includes two current interrupting devices placed in series with the 
main feed from the spare battery that are fault-current activated. 
 
 This will preserve the spare Class 1E battery integrity should the non-Class 1E bus 
experience an electrical fault. This arrangement will not degrade the electrical independence 
of the Class 1E safety circuits. 
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Class 1E UPS One Line Diagram 
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1.2.2 Non-Class 1E DC and UPS System 
 
The non-Class 1E dc and UPS system consists of the electric power supply and distribution 
equipment that provide dc and uninterruptible ac power to the plant non-Class 1E dc and ac loads 
that are critical for plant operation and investment protection and to the hydrogen igniters located 
inside containment.  
 
The non-class 1E dc and UPS system is comprised of two subsystems representing two separate 
power supply trains. The subsystems are located in separate rooms in the annex building. Each of 
the EDS1 and 3, and 2 and 4 subsystems consist of separate dc distribution buses. These two 
buses can be connected by a normally open circuit breaker to enhance the power supply source 
availability. Each dc subsystem includes battery chargers, stationary batteries, dc distribution 
equipment, and associated monitoring and protection devices.  
 
DC buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 provide 125 Vdc power to the associated inverter units that supply the ac 
power to the non-Class 1E uninterruptible power supply ac system. An alternate regulated ac 
power source for the UPS buses is supplied from the associated regulating transformers. DC bus 
5 supplies large dc motors. This configuration isolates the large motors. 
 
The onsite standby diesel generator backed 480 Vac distribution system provides the normal ac 
power to the battery chargers. Industry standard stationary batteries that are similar to the Class 
1E design are provided to supply the dc power source in case the battery chargers fail to supply 
the dc distribution bus system loads. 
 
 The batteries are sized to supply the system loads for a period of at least two hours after loss of 
all ac power sources. The dc distribution switchboard houses the dc feeder protection device, dc 
bus ground fault detection, and appropriate metering. The component design and the current 
interrupting device selection follow the circuit coordination principles.  
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Each of the EDS1 through 4 non-Class 1E dc distribution subsystem bus has provisions to allow 
the connection of a spare non-Class 1E battery charger should its non-Class 1E battery charger 
be unavailable due to maintenance, testing, or failure.  
 
EDS5 does not require this capability because  the only load on the charger is the battery. The 
non-Class 1E dc system uses the Class 1E spare battery bank as a temporary replacement for any 
primary non-Class 1E battery bank. In this design configuration, the spare Class 1E battery bank 
would be connected to the non-Class 1E dc bus, but could not simultaneously supply Class 1E 
safety loads nor perform safety-related functions.  
 
For EDS1 through EDS4, this is accomplished by opening the disconnect switch between the 
two 125 Vdc battery cell strings, which together, comprise the 250 Vdc spare battery. 
Additionally, the design includes two current interrupting devices placed in series with the main 
feed from the spare battery that are fault-current activated. This will preserve the spare Class 1E 
battery integrity should the non-Class 1E bus experience an electrical fault. This arrangement 
will not degrade the electrical independence of the Class 1E safety circuits. 
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Non-Class1E DC And UPS System Single Line Diagram. 
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Non-Class1E DC And UPS System Single Line Diagram    
 
 
1.2.3 Separation and Ventilation 
 
For the Class 1E dc system, the 24-hour and the 72-hour battery banks are housed in the 
auxiliary building in ventilated rooms apart from chargers and distribution equipment. The 
battery rooms are ventilated to limit hydrogen accumulation. Each of the four divisions of dc 
systems are electrically isolated and physically separated to prevent an event from causing the 
loss of more than one division. 
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   1.2.4 Maintenance and Testing 
 
Components of the 125 Vdc and 250 Vdc systems undergo periodic maintenance tests to 
determine the condition of the system. Batteries are checked for electrolyte level, specific gravity 
and cell voltage, and are visually inspected. The surveillance testing of the Class 1E 250 Vdc 
system is performed as required by the Technical Specifications. The inverter DC input 
protection will be set at least 10% higher than the battery charger trip set points to prevent the 
inverter tripping before the battery charger. The time delay for the inverter high dc input voltage 
trip will be set higher than the time delay for the battery charger to prevent the inverter tripping 
before the battery charger. 
 
Testing of battery, inverter, transformer and battery charger. 
 
1.2.4.1 Class 1E 24-Hour Battery Capacity Testing 
Each Class 1E 24-hour battery is tested to verify the capability to provide its load for 24 hours 
while maintaining the battery terminal voltage above the minimum voltage. Analysis will be 
performed based on the design duty cycle, and testing will be performed with loads which 
envelope the analyzed battery bank design duty cycle. Each battery is 
Connected to a charger maintained at 270±2 V for a period of at least 24 hours prior to the test to 
assure the battery is fully charged. 
 
 
1.2.4.2 Class 1E 72-Hour Battery Capacity Testing 
Each Class 1E 72-hour battery is tested to verify the capability to provide its load for 72 hours 
while maintaining the battery terminal voltage above the minimum voltage. Analysis will be 
performed based on the design duty cycle, and testing will be performed with loads which 
envelope the analyzed battery bank design duty cycle. Each battery is 
connected to a charger maintained at 270±2 V for a period of at least 24 hours prior to the test to 
assure the battery is fully charged. 
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1.2.4.3 Class 1E 24-Hour Inverter Capacity Testing 
Eac Class 1E 24-hour inverter is tested to verify the capability to provide 12 kW while 
maintaining the output voltage and frequency within the tolerances. The 12 kW capacity is 
sufficient to meet the 24-hour inverter loads. The inverter input voltage will be no more than 210 
Vdc during the test to represent the conditions at the battery end of life. 
 
 
1.2.4.4 Class 1E 72-Hour Inverter Capacity Testing 
Each Class 1E 72-hour inverter is tested to verify the capability to provide 7 kW while 
maintaining the output voltage and frequency within the tolerances The 7 kW capacity is 
sufficient to meet the 72-hour inverter loads.  The inverter input voltage will be no more than 
210 Vdc during the test to represent the conditions at the battery end of life 
 
 
1.2.4.5 Class 1E 24-Hour Charger Capacity Testing 
Each Class 1E 24-hour charger is tested to verify the capability to provide 150 A while 
maintaining the output voltage within the range. The 150 A is sufficient to meet the 24-hour 
loads while maintaining the corresponding battery charged. 
 
 
1.2.4.6 Class 1E 72-Hour Charger Capacity Testing 
Each Class 1E 72-hour charger is tested to verify the capability to provide 125 A while 
maintaining the output voltage within the range. The 125 A is sufficient to meet the 72-hour 
loads, while maintaining the corresponding battery charged. 
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1.2.4.7 Class 1E Regulating Transformer Capacity Testing 
Each Class 1E regulating transformer is tested to verify the capability to provide 30 kW while 
maintaining the output voltage within the tolerance. The 30 kW capacity is sufficient to meet the 
inverter loads  
 
 
1.2.4.8 Motor-Operated Valves Terminal Voltage Testing 
The operating voltage supplied to Class 1E motor-operated valves is measured to verify the 
motor starter input terminal voltage is above the minimum design value of 200 Vdc. The battery 
terminal voltage will be no more than 210 Vdc during the test to represent the conditions at the 
battery end of life. 
 
 
1.2.4.9 Non-Class 1E Battery Capacity Testing 
Each load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 non-Class 1E battery is tested to verify the capability to provide 
500 A for two hours while maintaining the battery terminal voltage above the minimum voltage. 
The 500 A is sufficient to meet the loads. Each battery is connected to a charger maintained at 
135±1 V for a period of at least 24 hours prior to the test to assure the battery is fully charged. 
 
 
1.2.4.10 Non-Class 1E Inverter Capacity Testing 
Each load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 non-Class 1E inverter is tested to verify the capability to 
provide35 kW while maintaining the output voltage and frequency within the tolerances The 35 
kW capacity is sufficient to meet the loads 
 
 
1.2.4.11 Non-Class 1E Charger Capacity Testing 
Each load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 non-Class 1E charger is tested to verify the capability to provide 
550 A while maintaining the output voltage within the range. The 550 A is sufficient to meet the 
loads while maintaining the corresponding battery charged 
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1.3 Offsite Power System  
 
1.3.1 System Description  
 
A transmission system to supply offsite ac energy for startup and normal shutdown through a 
site-specific transmission switchyard. This offsite ac power system is not required for plant 
safety. The normal ac power supply to the main ac power system is provided from the main 
generator.  
 
When the main generator is not available, plant auxiliary power is provided from the switchyard 
by back feeding through the main step up and unit auxiliary transformers. This is the preferred 
power supply. When neither the normal or the preferred power supply is available due to an 
electrical fault at either the main step up transformer, unit auxiliary transformer, isophase bus, or 
6.9kv non segregated bus duct, fast bus transfer will be automatically initiated to transfer the 
loads to the reserve auxiliary transformers powered by maintenance sources of power.  
 
In addition, two non-Class 1E onsite standby diesel generators supply power to selected plant 
loads in the event of loss of the normal, preferred, and maintenance power sources. The reserve 
auxiliary transformers also serve as a source of maintenance power. The maintenance sources are 
site-specific.  
 
Maintenance power is provided at the medium voltage level (6.9 kV) through normally open 
circuit breakers. Bus transfer to the maintenance source is automatic under fast bus transfer logic 
or may be initiated manually. Connection of the preferred and maintenance power supplies to the 
utility grid or other power sources is site-specific. The main generator is connected to the offsite 
power system via three single-phase main step up transformers. 
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 The normal power source for the plant auxiliary ac loads is provided from the isophase 
generator bus through the two unit auxiliary transformers of identical ratings. In the event of a 
loss of the main generator, the power is maintained without interruption from the preferred 
power supply by an auto-trip of the main generator breaker.  
 
Power then flows from the transformer area to the auxiliary loads through the main and unit 
auxiliary transformers.  The transmission system is site-specific.  The transmission line structures 
associated with the plant are designed to withstand standard loading conditions for the specific-
site as provided.  Automatic load dispatch is not used at the plant and does not interface with 
safety-related action required of the reactor protection system. 
 
1.3.2 Transformer Area  
 
The transformer area contains the main step up transformers, the unit auxiliary transformers, and 
the reserve auxiliary transformers. Protective relaying and metering required for this equipment 
is located in the turbine building. The necessary power sources (480 Vac, 120 Vac, and 125 Vdc) 
to the equipment are supplied from the turbine building. One feeder connects the transformer 
area with the switchyard to supply power to/from the main step up transformers for the unit.  
 
1.3.3 Grid Stability 
 
The AP1000 is designed with passive safety-related systems for core cooling and containment 
integrity and, therefore, does not depend on the electric power grid for safe operation. This 
feature of the AP1000 significantly reduces the importance of the grid connection and the 
requirement for grid stability. The AP1000 safety analyses assume that the reactor coolant pumps 
can receive power from either the main generator or the grid for a minimum of 3 seconds 
following a turbine trip.  
 
The AP1000 main generator is connected to the generator bus through the generator circuit 
breaker. The grid is connected to the generator bus through the main step-up transformers and 
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the grid breakers. The reactor coolant pumps are connected to the generator bus through the 
reactor coolant pump breakers, the 6.9 kV switchgear, and the unit auxiliary transformers.  
 
During normal plant operation the main generator supplies power to the generator bus. Some of 
this power is used by the plant auxiliary systems (including the reactor coolant pumps); the rest 
of the power is supplied to the grid.  If, during power operation of the plant, a turbine trip occurs, 
the motive power (steam) to the turbine will be removed.  
 
The generator will attempt to keep the shaft rotating at synchronous speed (governed by the grid 
frequency) by acting like a synchronous motor. The reverse-power relay monitoring generator 
power will sense this condition and, after a time delay of at least 15 seconds, open the generator 
breaker. During this delay time the generator will be able to provide voltage support to the grid if 
needed. The reactor coolant pumps will receive power from the grid for at least 3 seconds 
following the turbine trip. 
 
 A grid stability analysis to show that, with no electrical system failures, the grid will remain 
stable and the reactor coolant pump bus voltage will remain above the voltage required to 
maintain the flow analyses for a minimum of 3 seconds following a turbine trip. 
 
 If the initiating event is an electrical system failure (such as failure of the isophase bus), the 
analyses do not assume operation of the reactor coolant pumps following the turbine trip. The 
responsibility for setting the protective devices controlling the switchyard breakers with 
consideration given to preserving the plant grid connection following a turbine trip. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a large Nuclear Power Plant 
 
AIKTC Page 37 
 
1.4 Redundancy of system 
 
1.4.1 Physical Identification of Safety-Related Equipment 
 
Each safety-related circuit and raceway is given a unique identification number to distinguish 
between circuits and raceways of different voltage level or separation groups. Each raceway is 
color coded with indelible ink, paint, or adhesive markers (adhesive markers are not used in the 
containment) at intervals of 15 feet or less along the length of the raceway and on both sides of 
floor or wall penetrations. Each cable is color coded at a maximum of 5 feet intervals along the 
length of the cable and cable markers showing the cable identification number are applied at 
each end of the cable. The following color coding is used for identification purposes: 
 
Division Color Code 
A  Brown 
B  Green 
C  Blue 
D  Yellow 
 
 
1.4.2 Independence of Redundant Systems 
 
The routing of cable and the design of raceways prevents a single credible event from disabling a 
redundant safety-related plant function. 
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1.4.3 Raceway and Cable Routing 
 
There are five separation groups for the cable and raceway system: group A, B, C, D, and N. 
Separation group A contains safety-related circuits from division A. Similarly, separation group 
B contains safety-related circuits from division B; group C from division C; group D from 
division D; and group N from nonsafety-related circuits. Cables of one separation group are run 
in separate raceway and physically separated from cables of other separation groups. Group N 
raceways are separated from safety-related groups A, B, C and D. Raceways from group N are 
routed in the same areas as the safety-related groups. 
 
 Within the main control room and remote shutdown room (no hazard areas), the 
minimum vertical separation for open top cable tray is 3 inches and the minimum 
horizontal separation is 1 inch. 
 
  Within general plant areas (limited hazard areas), the minimum vertical separation is 12 
inches, and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for open top cable trays with 
low-voltage power circuits for cable sizes <2/0 AWG. For configurations that involve 
exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control), these minimum 
distances are reduced to 3 inches and 1 inch respectively. 
 
  Within panels and control switchboards, the minimum horizontal separation between 
components or cables of different separation groups (both field-routed and vendor-
supplied internal wiring) is 1 inch, and the minimum vertical separation distance is 6 
inches. 
 
 For configurations involving an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum 
vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway. 
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Separate trays are provided for each voltage service level: 6.9 kV, low voltage power (480 Vac, 
208Y/120 Vac, 125 Vdc, 250 Vdc), high-level signal and control (120 Vac, 125 Vdc, 250 Vdc), 
and low level signal (instrumentation).  
 
A tray designed for a single class of cables shall contain only cables of the same class except that 
low voltage power cables may be routed in raceways with high level signal and control cables if 
their respective sizes do not differ greatly and if they have compatible operating temperatures. 
 
 When this is done in trays, the power cable ampacity is calculated as if all cables in the tray are 
power cable. Low voltage power cable and high level signal and control cable will not be routed 
in common raceways if the fault current, within the breaker or fuse clearing time, is sufficient to 
heat the insulation to the ignition point. 
 
In general, a minimum of 12 inches vertical spacing is maintained between trays of different 
service levels within the stack. 
 
 
 
1.5 Hazard Protection 
 
Where hazards to safety-related raceways are identified, a predetermined minimum separation is 
maintained between the break and/or missile source and any safety-related raceway, or a barrier 
designed to withstand the effects of the hazard is placed to prevent damage to raceway of 
redundant systems.  Redundant circuits, devices, or equipment (different separation groups) are 
exposed to the same external hazard(s), predetermined spatial separation is provided. Where the 
spatial Separation cannot be met, qualified barriers are installed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2 Motor protection 
 
The electric motor is most essential drive in modern era of industrialization. From fractional hp 
AC motor used for different home appliances to giant motor and induction motor of up to 10,000 
hp used for different industrial applications, should be protected against different electrical and 
mechanical faults for serving their purposes smoothly. The motor characteristics must be very 
carefully considered in selecting the right motor protection scheme. 
 
The abnormalities in motor or motor faults may appear due to mainly two reasons- 
1. Conditions imposed by the external power supply network, 
2. Internal faults, either in the motor or in the driven plan 
 
Unbalanced supply voltages, under-voltage, reversed phase sequence and loss of synchronism (in 
the case of synchronous motor) come under former category. The latter category includes 
bearing failures, stator winding faults, motor earth faults and overload etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a large Nuclear Power Plant 
 
AIKTC Page 41 
 
2.1 Need for Motor Circuit Protection 
 
2.1.2Current and Temperature  
Current flow in a conductor always generates heat. The greater the current flow in any one size 
conductor, the hotter the conductor. Excess heat is damaging to electrical components and 
conductor insulation. For that reason, conductors have a rated, continuous current-carrying 
capacity or ampacity. Overcurrent protection devices, such as fuses, are used to protect 
conductors from excessive current flow. 
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Excessive current is referred to as overcurrent. The overcurrent is any current in excess of the 
rated current of equipment or the ampacity of a conductor. It may result from overload, short 
circuit, or ground fault. 
 
2.1.3 Overloads  
 
An overload occurs when too many devices are operated on a single circuit or when electrical 
equipment is made to work harder than its rated design. For example, a motor rated for 10 
amperes may draw 20, 30, or more amperes in an overload condition. In the following 
illustration, a package has become jammed on a conveyor, causing the motor to work harder and 
draw more current. Because the motor is drawing more current, it heats up. Damage will occur to 
the motor in a short time if the problem is not corrected or if the circuit is not shut down by an 
overcurrent protection device. 
 
 
2.1.4 Conductor Insulation 
 
 Motors, of course, are not the only devices that require circuit protection for an overload 
condition. Every circuit requires some form of protection against overcurrent. Heat is one of the 
major causes of insulation failure of any electrical component. High levels of heat to insulated 
wire can cause the insulation to breakdown, melt, or flake off, exposing conductors.  
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2.1.5 Short Circuits 
 When two bare conductors touch, a short circuit occurs. When a short circuit occurs, resistance 
drops to almost zero. Short circuit current can be thousands of times higher than normal 
operating current. 
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Ohm’s Law demonstrates the relationship of current, voltage, and resistance. For example, a 240 
volt motor with 24 Ω (ohms) of resistance would normally draw 10 amperes of current. 
 
 
 
When a short circuit develops, resistance drops. If resistance drops to 24 milliohms, current will 
be 10,000 amperes. 
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2.1.5.1 Short-Circuit Current on unprotected electrical circuit 
 
When a short circuit occurs, current will continue to flow in an unprotected electrical circuit. The 
peak short-circuit 
Circuits current of the first cycle is the greatest and is referred to as peak let-thru current (IP). 
The force of this current can cause damage to wires, switches, and other electrical components of 
a circuit. 
 
Associated with the peak let-thru current is peak let-thru energy (I2t). For an unprotected 
circuit, this energy is often capable of dramatic destruction of equipment and is a serious safety 
concern. 
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2.1.5.2 Short-Circuit Current on Protected Electrical Circuits 
 
Fortunately, if a circuit has a properly applied overcurrent  
Protection device, the device will open the circuit quickly when if a short circuit occurs, limiting 
peak let-thru current (IP) and energy (I^2 ×t). 
 
 
The degree of motor protection system depends on the costs and applications of the electrical.  
2.2 Small Motor Protection Scheme 
 
Generally motors up to 30 hp are considered in small category. The small motor protection in 
this case is arranged by HRC fuse, bimetallic relay and under voltage relay – all assembled into 
the motor contractor – starter itself. 
 
Most common cause of motor burn outs on LV fuse protected system is due to single phasing. 
This single phasing may remain undetected even if the motors are protected by conventional 
bimetallic relay. It cannot be detected by a set of voltage relays connected across the lines. Since, 
even when one phase is dead, the motor maintains substantial back emf on its faulty phase 
terminal and hence voltage across the voltage relay is prevented from dropping – off. 
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The difficulties of detecting single phasing can be overcome by employing a set of three 
current operated relays as shown in the small motor protection circuit given below. 
 
The current operated relays are very simple instantaneous relays. There are mainly two parts in 
this relay one is a current coil and other is one or more normally open contacts (NO Contacts). 
The NO contacts are operated by the mmf of the current coil. This relay is connected in series 
with each phase of the supply and backup by HRC fuse.  
 
When the electrical motor starts and runs the supply current passes through the current coil of the 
protective. The mmf of the current coil makes the NO contacts closed. If suddenly a single 
phasing occurs the corresponding current through the current coil will falls and the contacts of 
the corresponding relay will become to its normal open position. The NO contacts of the all three 
relays are connected in series to hold – in the motor contractor. So if any one relay contact opens, 
results to release of motor contractor and hence motor will stop running. 
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2.3 Large Motor Protection 
Large motor especially induction motors require protection against- 
1. Motor bearing failure, 
2. Motor overheating, 
3. Motor winding failure, 
4. Reverse motor rotation. 
1. Motor Bearing Failure 
Ball and roller bearings are used for the motor up to 500 hp and beyond this size sleeve bearings 
are used. Failure of ball or roller bearing usually causes the motor to a standstill very quickly. 
Due to sudden mechanical jamming in motor bearing, the input current of the motor becomes 
very high. 
 
 Current operated protection, attached to the input of the motor cannot serve satisfactorily. Since 
this motor protection system has to be set to override the high motor starting current. The 
difficulty can be overcome by providing thermal over load relay. 
 
 As the starting current of the motor is high but exists only during starting so for that current the 
there will be no overheating effect. But over current due mechanical jamming exists for longer 
time hence there will be a overheating effect. So stalling motor protection can be offered by the 
thermal overload relay.  
 
Stalling protection can also be provided by separate definite time over current relay which is 
operated only after a certain predefined time if over current persists beyond that period. In the 
case of sleeve bearing, a temperature sensing device embedded in the bearing itself.  
This scheme of motor protection is more reliable and sensitive to motor bearing failure since 
the thermal withstand limit of the motor is quite higher than that of bearing. If we allow the 
bearing overheating and wait for motor thermal relay to trip, the bearing may be permanently 
damaged. The temperature sensing device embedded in the bearing stops the motor if the bearing 
temperature rises beyond its predefined limit. 
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2. Motor over Heating 
The main reason of motor over heating that means over heating of motor winding is due to 
either of mechanical over loading, reduced supply voltage, unbalanced supply voltage and single 
phasing. The overheating may cause deterioration of insulation life of motor hence it must be 
avoided by providing proper motor protection scheme. To avoid overheating, the motor should 
be isolated in 40 to 50 minutes even in the event of small overloads of the order of 10 %. 
The protective relay should take into account the detrimental heating effects on the motor rotor 
due to negative sequence currents in the stator arising out of unbalance in supply voltage. The 
motor should also be protected by instantaneous motor protection relay against single phasing 
such as a stall on loss of one phase when running at full load or attempting to start with only two 
of three phases alive. 
3. Motor Winding Failure 
The motor protection relay should have instantaneous trip elements to detect motor winding 
failure such as phase to phase and phase to earth faults. Preferably phase to phase fault unit 
should be energized from positive phase sequence component of the motor current and another 
instantaneous unit connected in the residual circuit of the current be used for earth faults 
protection. 
 
4. Reverse Motor Rotation 
Especially in the case of conveyor belt, the reverse motor rotation must be avoided. The 
reverse rotation during starting can be caused due to inadvertent reversing of supply phases. A 
comprehensive motor protection relay with an instantaneous negative sequence unit will satisfy 
this requirement. If such relay has not been provided, a watt-meter type relay can be employed. 
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2.4 Overcurrent Protection Devices 
 
An overcurrent protection device must be able to recognize the difference between an 
overcurrent and short circuit and respond in the proper way. Slight overcurrents can be allowed 
to continue for some period of time; but as the current magnitude increases, the protection device 
must open faster. Short circuits must be interrupted instantly.  
Fusible Disconnect Switch A fusible disconnect switch is one type of device used to provide 
overcurrent protection. Properly sized fuses located in the switch open the circuit when an 
overcurrent condition exists.  
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A fuse is a one-shot device. The heat produced by overcurrent causes the current carrying 
element to melt open, disconnecting the load from the source voltage 
 
 
 
 
2.4.1 Non-time-delay  
Non-time-delay fuses provide excellent short-circuit protection. When an overcurrent occurs, 
heat builds up rapidly in the fuse. Non-time-delay fuses usually hold 500% of their rating for 
approximately one-fourth second, after which the current-carrying element melts. This means 
that these fuses should not be used in motor circuits which often have inrush currents greater 
than 500%. 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Time-delay fuses  
Time-delay fuses provide overload and short-circuit protection. Time-delay fuses usually allow 
several times the rated current to flow for a short time to allow a motor to start.  
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2.4.3 Fuse Classes  
 
Fuses are grouped into classes based on their operating and construction characteristics. Each 
class has an interrupting rating (IR) in amperes which is the amount of fault current this class of 
fuses is capable of interrupting without destroying the fuse casing.  
 
Fuses are also rated according to the maximum continuous current and maximum voltage they 
can handle. Underwriters Laboratories (UL) establishes and standardizes basic performance and 
physical specifications to develop its safety-test procedures.  
 
These standards have resulted in distinct classes of low-voltage fuses rated at 600 volts or less. 
The following chart lists the fuse class and its ratings. 
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2.5 Circuit Breakers 
 
 Another device used for overcurrent protection is a circuit breaker. The circuit breaker is a 
device designed to open and close the circuit by no automatic means and to open the circuit 
automatically on predetermined overcurrent without damage to itself when properly applied 
within its rating.   
 
Circuit breakers provide a manual means of energizing and de-energizing a circuit. In addition, 
circuit breakers provide automatic overcurrent protection of a circuit. One key advantage of a 
circuit breaker is that it allows a circuit to be reactivated quickly after a short circuit or overload 
is cleared by simply resetting the breaker. 
 
 
 
Ampere Rating Like fuses; every circuit breaker has ampere, voltage, and interrupting ratings. 
The ampere rating is the maximum continuous current a circuit breaker can carry without 
exceeding its rating. In general, the circuit breaker ampere rating should not exceed the 
conductor ampere rating.  
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For example, if the conductor is rated for 20 amps, the circuit breaker rating should not exceed 
20 amps. Siemens breakers are rated on the basis of using 60° C or 75° C conductors. This 
means that even if a conductor with a higher temperature rating were used, the ampacity of the 
conductor must be figured on its 60° C or 75° C rating. 
 
Voltage rating the voltage rating of the circuit breaker must be at least equal to the supply 
voltage. The voltage rating of a circuit breaker can be higher than the supply voltage, but never 
lower. For example, a 480 VAC circuit breaker could be used on a 240 VAC circuit. A 240 VAC 
circuit breaker could not be used on a 480 VAC circuit. The voltage rating is a function of the 
circuit breakers ability to suppress the internal arc that occurs when the circuit breakers contacts 
open. 
 
Fault-Current Circuit breakers are also rated according to the level of fault 
Interrupting Rating current they can interrupt. When applying a circuit breaker, one must be 
selected to sustain the largest potential short-circuit current which can occur in the selected 
application. Siemens circuit breakers have interrupting ratings from 10,000 to 200,000 amps. 
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Motor Control Center (Diagram)  
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CHAPTER3 
 
3. Transformer Area 
There are different kinds of transformers such as two winding or three winding electrical power 
transformers, auto transformer, regulating transformers, ear thing, rectifier transformers etc. 
Different transformers demand different schemes of transformer protection depending upon their 
importance, winding connections, earthing and mode of operation etc. 
It is common practice to provide Buchholz relay protection to all 0.5 MVA and above 
transformers. While for all small size distribution transformers, only high voltage fuses are used 
as main protective device. For all larger rated and important distribution transformers, 
over current protection along with restricted earth fault protection is applied. Differential 
protection should be provided in the transformers rated above 5 MVA. 
Depending upon the normal service condition, nature of transformer faults, degree of sustained 
over load, scheme of tap changing, and many other factors, the suitable transformer 
protection schemes are chosen.  
3.1 Nature of Transformer Faults 
Although an electrical power transformer is a static device, but internal stresses arising from 
abnormal system conditions, must be taken into consideration. 
A transformer generally suffers from following types of transformer fault- 
1. Over current due to overloads and external short circuits, 
2. Terminal faults, 
3. Winding faults, 
4. Incipient faults. 
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The entire above mentioned transformer faults cause mechanical and thermal stresses inside the 
transformer winding and its connecting terminals. Thermal stresses lead to overheating which 
ultimately affect the insulation system of transformer. Deterioration of insulation leads to 
winding faults. Some time failure of transformer cooling system, leads to overheating of 
transformer. So the transformer protection schemes are very much required.The short 
circuit current of an electrical transformer is normally limited by its reactance and for low 
reactance, the value of short circuit current may be excessively high. The duration of external 
short circuits which a transformer can sustain without damage as given in BSS 171:1936. 
 
TRANSFORMER % REACTANCE PERMITTED FAULT DURATION IN SECONDS 
4 % 2 
5 % 3 
6 % 4 
7 % and over 5 
 
The general winding faults in transformer are either earth faults or inter-turns faults. Phase to 
phase winding faults in a transformer is rare. The phase faults in an electrical transformer may be 
occurred due to bushing flash over and faults in tap changer equipment. Whatever may be the 
faults, the transformer must be isolated instantly during fault otherwise major breakdown may 
occur in the electrical power system. Incipient faults are internal faults which constitute no 
immediate hazard. But it these faults are over looked and not taken care of, these may lead to 
major faults. The faults in this group are mainly inter-lamination short circuit due to insulation 
failure between core lamination, lowering the oil level due to oil leakage, blockage of oil flow 
paths. All these faults lead to overheating. So transformer protection scheme is required for 
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incipient transformer faults also. The earth fault, very nearer to neutral point of transformer star 
winding may also be considered as an incipient fault. 
Influence of winding connections and earthing on earth fault current magnitude. 
There are mainly two conditions for earth fault current to flow during winding to earth faults, 
1. A current exists for the current to flow into and out of the winding. 
2. Ampere-turns balance is maintained between the windings. 
The value of winding earth fault current depends upon position of the fault on the winding, 
method of winding connection and method of earthing. The star point of the windings may be 
earthed either solidly or via a resistor. On delta side of the transformer the system is earthed 
through an earthing transformer. transformer provides low impedance path to the zero 
sequence current and high impedance to the positive and negative sequence currents. 
3.2 Star Winding with Neutral Resistance Earthed 
In this case the neutral point of the transformer is earthed via a resistor and the value of 
impedance of it, is much higher than that of winding impedance of the transformer. That means 
the value of transformer winding impedance is negligible compared to impedance of 
earthing resistor. The value of earth current is, therefore, proportional to the position of the fault 
in the winding. As the fault current in the primary winding of the transformer is proportional to 
the ratio of the short circuited secondary turns to the total turns on the primary winding, the 
primary fault current will be proportional to the square of the percentage of winding short 
circuited.  
3.3 Star Winding with Neutral Solidly Earthed 
In this case the earth fault current magnitude is limited solidly by the winding impedance and the 
fault is no longer proportional to the position of the fault. The reason for this non linearity is 
unbalanced flux linkage. 
Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a large Nuclear Power Plant 
 
AIKTC Page 59 
 
3.4 Three winding Transformers 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
       In addition to primary and secondary windings, the transformers may be constructed with 
the third winding. This winding is called tertiary winding. The normal two winding transformer 
can be converted into three winding transformer with an additional secondary winding having 
number of turns as per the requirements. 
 
3.4.2 Why to use tertiary winding? 
 
       There are many reasons for which three winding transformers are employed. Some of the 
reasons are listed below. 
 
1. If a two winding transformer has to supply an additional load which has to be insulated from 
the secondary windings for some reasons then three winding transformer may used with 
additional load carried by tertiary winding. 
 
2. The phase compensating devices can be supplied with three winding transformer which are 
not operating at either primary or secondary voltage but at some different voltage. 
 
3. The tertiary winding can be used as a voltage coil in a testing transformer. 
 
4. Three supply systems operating at different voltages can be interconnected using three 
winding transformer. 
 
5. The three winding transformer can be used to load large split winding generators. 
 
6. The substation requirements can be met using three winding transformer which requires a 
voltage different from that of primary and secondary windings. 
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7. The tertiary winding connected in delta reduces the impedance offered to the zero sequence 
currents so a larger earth fault current flows for proper operation of protective equipment. For 
unbalanced load it limits the imbalance in voltage. It permits the flow of third harmonic current 
to reduce third harmonic voltage. 
 
       The third winding known as tertiary winding is generally connected in delta. Thus when any 
fault or short circuit occurs on the primary or secondary sides, there will be large unbalance of 
phase voltage which is compressed by large tertiary winding circulating current. The reactance of 
the tertiary winding must be such as to limit the circulating current to that which can be carried 
by copper in order to avoid overheating of tertiary winding under fault conditions. 
 
 
3.4.3 Stabilizing Due to Tertiary Winding 
       For unbalanced single phase load, the star-star connection offers high reactance to flow of 
current. Any unbalanced load current has three components viz positive, negative and zero 
sequence components. The zero sequence component on the secondary side can not be balanced 
by primary currents as zero sequence currents can not flow in the isolated neutral of star 
connected primary. On the secondary side the zero sequence current sets up magnetic flux in the 
core. The iron path is available for this flux and the impedance offered to the zero sequence 
currents is very high. But the delta connected tertiary winding permits circulation of zero 
sequence currents in it. So impedance offered to the flow of zero sequence currents is lowered. 
For this purpose the tertiary winding is called stabilizing winding. This is shown in the Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1 
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3.4.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of Three Winding Transformer 
 
       The advantages of a three winding transformer are as given below 
 
i) It can supply additional load providing insulation from secondary windings. 
 
ii) It can act as a source of voltage at substation to meet the internal load demand of substation 
which is at different voltage that either of primary or secondary voltage level. 
 
iii) The reactive power injection into the system is possible for voltage control by connecting 
synchronous condensers or static capacitors to the tertiary winding. 
 
iv) A delta connected tertiary winding offers less impedance to the flow of zero sequence 
currents. The allows larger earth fault current to flow through protective device facilitating its 
proper operation. 
 
v) It reduces voltage unbalance under unbalanced loading conditions and permits third harmonic 
current to flow which reduces third harmonic voltages. 
 
vi) Three transmission lines at different voltage levels can be interconnected by using three 
winding transformer. 
 
vii) The third winding of a three winding transformer, usually called tertiary winding can be used 
to serve purpose of measuring voltage of HV testing transformer. 
   
     The disadvantage of a three winding transformer is its construction is little complicated as 
compared to normal two winding transformer. A separate third winding is required to be placed 
which requires more copper and hence cost of three winding transformer is obviously more. The 
core of the transformer has to carry three windings instead of two as in case of normal two 
winding transformer. 
Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a large Nuclear Power Plant 
 
AIKTC Page 62 
 
CHAPTER4 
 
4 Protection of Lines or Feeder 
 
As the length of electrical power transmission line is generally long enough and it runs through 
open atmosphere, the probability of occurring fault in electrical power transmission line is much 
higher than that of electrical power transformers and alternators. That is why a transmission line 
requires much more protective schemes than a transformer and an alternator. 
 
 
Protection of line should have some special features, such as- 
1. During fault, the only circuit breaker closest to the fault point should be tripped. 
2. If the circuit breaker closest the faulty point, fails to trip the circuit breaker just next to this 
breaker will trip as back up. 
3. The operating time of relay associated with protection of line should be as minimum as possible 
in order to prevent unnecessary tripping of circuit breakers associated with other healthy parts of 
power system. 
These above mentioned requirements cause protection of transmission line much different 
from protection of transformer and other equipment of power systems. The main three methods 
of transmission line protection are – 
1. Time graded over current protection. 
2. Differential protection. 
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4.1 Time Graded Over Current Protection 
This may also be referred simply as over-current protection of electrical power transmission line. 
Let’ discuss different schemes of time graded over current protection. 
4.1.1 Over Current Line Protection by Inverse Relay 
 
The drawback as we discussed just in definite time over current protection of transmission line, 
can easily be overcome by using inverse time relays. In inverse relay the time of operation is 
inversely proportional to fault current. 
 
 
In the above figure, overall time setting of relay at point D is minimum and successively this 
time setting is increased for the relays associated with the points towards the point A. 
 
In case of any fault at point F will obviously trip CB-3 at point D. In failure of opening CB-3, 
CB-2 will be operated as overall time setting is higher in relay at point C. 
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Although, the time setting of relay nearest to the source is maximum but still it will trip in 
shorter period, if major fault occurs near the source, as the time of operation of relay is inversely 
proportional to faulty current. 
 
4.1.2 Over Current Protection of Parallel Feeders 
 
For maintaining stability of the system it is required to feed a load from source by two or more 
than two feeders in parallel. If fault occurs in any of the feeders, only that faulty feeder should be 
isolated from the system in order to maintain continuity of supply from source to load. 
 
 This requirement makes the protection of parallel feeders little bit more complex than simple 
non direction over current protection of line as in the case of radial feeders. The protection of 
parallel feeder requires to use directional relays and to grade the time setting of relay for 
selective tripping. 
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There are two feeders connected in parallel from source to load. Both of the feeders have non-
directional over current relay at source end. These relays should be inverse time relay. Also both 
of the feeders have directional relay or reverse power relay at their load end. The reverse power 
relays used here should be instantaneous type. That means these relays should be operated as 
soon as flow of power in the feeder is reversed. The normal direction of power from source to 
load. 
 
Now, suppose a fault occurs at point F, say the fault current is If. This fault will get two parallel 
paths from source, one through circuit breaker A only and other via CB-B, feeder-2, CB-Q, load 
bus and CB-P. This is clearly shown in figure below, where IA and IB are current of fault shared 
by feeder-1 and feeder-2 respectively. 
 
 
 
As per Kirchhoff’s current law, IA + IB = If. 
 
Now, IA is flowing through CB-A, IB is flowing through CB-P. As the direction of flow of CB-P 
is reversed it will trip instantly.  
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But CB-Q will not trip as flow of current (power) in this circuit breaker is not reversed. As soon 
as CB-P is tripped, the fault current IB stops flowing through feeder and hence there is no 
question of further operating of inverse time over current relay.  
 
IA still continues to flow even CB-P is tripped. Then because of over current, CB-A will trip. In 
this way the faulty feeder is isolated from system. 
 
4.2 Busbar Protection 
 
In early days only conventional over current relays were used for busbar protection. But it is 
desired that fault in any feeder or transformer connected to the busbar should not disturb busbar 
system. In viewing of this time setting of busbar protection relays are made lengthy. So when 
faults occur on busbar itself, it takes much time to isolate the bus from source which may come 
much damage in the bus system. 
 
 
In recent days, the second zone distance protection relays on incoming feeder, with operating 
time of 0.3 to 0.5 seconds have been applied for busbar protection. 
But this scheme has also a main disadvantage. This scheme of protection can not discriminate the 
faulty section of the busbar. 
 
Now days, electrical power system deals with huge amount of power. Hence any interruption in 
total bus system causes big loss to the company. So it becomes essential to isolate only faulty 
section of busbar during bus fault. 
 
Another drawback of second zone distance protection scheme is that, sometime the clearing time 
is not short enough to ensure the system stability. 
 
To overcome the above mentioned difficulties, differential busbar protection scheme with an 
operating time less than 0.1 sec., is commonly applied to many SHT bus systems. 
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4.2.1 Voltage Differential Protection of Busbar 
The current differential scheme is sensitive only when the CTs do not get saturated and maintain 
same current ratio, phase angle error under maximum faulty condition. This is usually not 80, 
particularly, in the case of an external fault on one of the feeders. The CT on the faulty feeder 
may be saturated by total current and consequently it will have very large errors. Due to this 
large error, the summation of secondary current of all CTs in a particular zone may not be zero. 
So there may be a high chance of tripping of all circuit breakers associated with this protection 
zone even in the case of an external large fault. To prevent this maloperation 
of current differential busbar protection, the 87 relays are provided with high pick up current and 
enough time delay. 
The greatest troublesome cause of current transformer saturation is the transient dc component of 
the short circuit current. 
These difficulties can be overcome by using air core CTs. This current transformer is also called 
linear coupler. As the core of the CT does not use iron the secondary characteristic of these CTs, 
is straight line. 
In voltage differential busbar protection the CTs of all incoming and outgoing feeders are 
connected in series instead of connecting them in parallel. 
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The secondaries of all CTs and differential relay form a closed loop. If polarity of all CTs are 
properly matched, the sum of voltage across all CT secondaries is zero. Hence there would be no 
resultant voltage appears across the differential relay. When a buss fault occurs, sum of the all 
CT secondary voltage is no longer zero. Hence, there would be current circulate in the loop due 
to the resultant voltage. As this loop current also flows through the differential relay, the relay is 
operated to trip all the circuit beaker associated with protected bus zone. Except when ground 
fault current is severally limited by neutral impedance there is usually no selectivity problem 
when such a problem exists, it is solved by use of additional more sensitive relaying equipment 
including a supervising protective. 
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CHAPTER5 
 
5 Grounding Systems 
 
5.1 What is Grounding? 
Equipment earthing or earthing is a connection done through a metal link between the body of 
any electrical appliance, or neutral point, as the case may be, to the deeper ground soil. The 
metal link is normally of MS flat, CI flat, GI wire which should be penetrated to the ground earth 
grid. 
5.2 Necessity of Equipment Earthing/Grounding 
 
(a)Safety of personnel  
 
(b)Safety of equipment Prevent or at least minimize damage to equipment as a result of flow of 
heavy currents. 
 
(c) Improvement of the reliability of the power system. 
5.3 Classification of Earthing/Grounding 
The earthing is broadly divided as 
 
a) System earthing (Connection between part of plant in an operating system like LV neutral of 
a power transformer winding) and earth. 
Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a large Nuclear Power Plant 
 
AIKTC Page 70 
 
 
b) Equipment earthing (safety grounding) connecting bodies of equipment (like electric body, 
transformer tank, switchgear box, operating rods of air break switches, LV breaker body, HV 
breaker body, feeder breaker bodies etc) to earth. 
 
5.4 Permissible Values of Earth Resistance 
a) Power stations – 0.5 ohms 
b) EHT stations – 1.0 ohms 
c) 33KV SS – 2 ohms 
d) DTR structures – 5 ohms 
e) Tower foot resistance – 10 ohms 
5.5 What are the Basics for arriving at Permissible Earth Resistances? 
As per IE rules one has to have a definite base for that as per IE rules one has to keep touch 
potential less than 
a) Recommended safe value 523 volts 
b) Ifault = maximum current in fault conditions, 
 
c) Maximum fault current is 100 KVA the current in 100 KVA is about 100 A; where percentage 
impedance is 4% 
 
d) For a substation of 100 KVA transformer 
 
0.26 ohms being quite low, quality work is to be done during construction, to obtain such a value 
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of earthing system, and the expenditure for that will be very high. 
Hence the electrical inspectors are insisting about 1.0 ohm. This seems justifying for the urban 
areas. This value may be 2 ohms in case of rural areas, which is recommended by most of the 
authorities. 
e) The earth electrode resistance value also carries importance in view of full protection by 
lightning arrestors against lightning. 
The earth electrode resistance value in that case is given by the formula 
 
Flash over voltage of 11KV = 75 KV 
Lightning arrestor Displacement = 40 KA. 
 
 
5.6 Type of Earthing/Grounding 
5.6.1 Plate Type Earthing/Grounding 
In this, cast Iron plate of size 600 mm X 600 mm X 6.3 mm thick plate is being used as earth 
plate. This is being connected with Hot dip GI main earth strip of size 50mm X 6mm thick X 2.5 
meter long by means of nut, bolts & washers of required size. The main earth strip is connected 
with hot dip GI strip of size 40mm X 3mm of required length as per the site location up to the 
equipment earth / neutral connection. The earth plate is back filled & covered with earthing 
material (mixture of charcoal & salt) by 150mm from all six sides. The remaining pit is back 
filled with excavated earth. Along with earth plate, rigid PVC pipe of 2.5 meter long is also 
provided in the earth pit for watering purpose for to keep the earthing resistance within specific 
limit. 
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5.6.2 Pipe Type Earthing/Grounding 
In this hot dip GI pipe of size 40mm dia X 2.5 meter is being used for equipment earthing. This 
pipe is perforated at each interval of 100mm and is tapered at lower end. A clamped is welded 
with this pipe at 100mm below the top for making connection with hot dip GI strip of size 40mm 
X 3mm of required length as per the site location up to the equipment earth / neutral connection. 
On its open end funnel is being fitted for watering purpose. The earth pipe is placed inside 2700 
mm depth pit. A 600mm dia “farma“of GI sheet or cement pipe in two halves is placed around 
the pipe. Then the angular space between this “farma” and earth pipe is back filled with alternate 
layer of 300mm height with salt and charcoal. The remaining space outside “farma” will be 
backfilled by excavated earth. The “farma” is gradually lifted up as the backfilling up progresses. 
Thus the pit is being filled up to the 300mm below the ground level. This remaining portion is 
covered by constructing a small chamber of brick so that top open end of pipe and connection 
with main earth pipe will be accessible for attending when necessary. The chamber is closed by 
wooden / stone cover. Water is poured into the pipe through its open end funnel to keep the 
earthing resistance within specific limit. 
Other types of earthing: When the capabilities of certain equipment are limited, they may not 
with stand certain fault currents then the following types of earthing are resorted to limit the fault 
current.  
(a) Resistance earthing  
(b) Reactance earthing 
(c)  Peterson coil earthing. 
(d)  Earthing through grounding transformer. 
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5.7 Grounding Grids 
       The low ground resistance in case of high voltage substations can be obtained with the use 
of interconnected ground grids. In a typical grounding grid system, a number of interconnected 
bare solid copper conductors are buried at a depth of 0.3 to 0.6 m and spaced in a grid pattern. It 
provides common earth for all devices and metallic structures in the substation. 
       At each of the junction point, the conductors are bonded together. This system is usually 
supported by a number of vertical rods about 3 m long at some joints. 
       If a is cross-sectional area of copper, in circular miles, t is the fault duration in seconds, 
Tm is the maximum allowable temperature and Ta is the ambient temperature then the size of grid 
conductors required which prevents fusing under the fault current is given as, 
 
       If the grid depth is less than 0.25 m then the earthing resistance of the grid is given by, 
 
       Here R = Grid resistance in ohms 
                 a = Ground area occupied by grid in m2 
                 L = Total length of buried conductors in m 
       But when the grid depth is greater than 0.25 m then earthing resistance is given by, 
 
       The effective grounding of the equipment is possible through the grid. Also the voltage 
gradient at the surface of the earth can be controlled at safe value for human contacts with the 
addition of ground rods; the ground resistance further reduces when soil resistivity in the upper 
layer is more than the soil underneath. 
 
 
 
Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a large Nuclear Power Plant 
 
AIKTC Page 74 
 
5.8 Grounding Transformer 
 
       If a neutral point is required or not available in case of delta connections and bus bar points, 
a zig-zag transformer is used. Earthed transformer are used for providing the neutral pint for such 
cases. It is a core-type transformer having three limbs built-up in the same manner as that of a 
power transformer. Each limb accommodates two equally-spaced windings and the way they are 
connected is shown in the Fig. 1. It will be seen that the current in the two halves of the winding 
on each limb acts in opposite directions. These currents do not allow undeserving harmonics to 
prevail in the circuit, and thereby, the stresses on the insulation of the transformer are 
considerably reduced. 
 
Fig. 1  Representation of an earthing transformer 
       The impedance of the earthing transformers is quite low, and therefore, the fault current will 
be quite high. The magnitude of the fault current is limited by inserting resistance either in the 
neutral circuit as shown in Fig. 2 or in the windings of the earthing transformer. Components of 
various currents flowing under the conditions are also shown therein. 
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Fig. 2  Insertion of resistance in the neutral circuit 
       
 
 The terminals of the earthing transformers are soldered to the power transformer for obtaining a 
solid connection between them. The capacity of the earthing transformer is denoted by the fault 
current it is capable of handling. Under normal operating conditions, it is only iron losses that are 
continuously present; copper losses are present only when the fault occurs. These copper losses 
are present only for short periods due to the short duration of fault (in the order of a few 
seconds). 
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CHAPTER6 
 
6 Lighting Arrester and Surge Arrester 
 
That is why all electrical equipment and insulators of power system must be protected against 
electrical surges. The method of protecting system from surge is normally referred as surge 
protection. The main equipment commonly used for this purpose is lightning arrester or surge 
arrester.  
 
There are two types of surges one comes externally from atmosphere such as atmospheric 
lightning. Second type is originated from electrical system itself, such as switching surges. 
 
When an electrically charged cloud comes nearby an electrical transmission line, the cloud 
induces electrical charges in the line. When the charged cloud is suddenly discharged, through 
lightning, the induced charged in the transmission line is no longer confined static. It starts 
travelling and originate dynamic transient over voltage.  
 
This transient overvoltage travels towards both load and source side, on the transmission line 
because of distributed line inductance and stray capacitance. This surge voltage travels with 
speed of light. At the end of the transmission line, as the surge impedance changes, the surge 
voltage wave reflected back. This forward and backward travelling of surge voltage wave 
continues until the energy of the surge or impulse is attenuated by line resistance.  
 
This phenomenon causes voltage stress on the transmission system many times greater than 
normal rated voltage of the system. Hence, surge protection scheme must be provided to 
the electrical power transmission system to make reliable and healthy system. Lightning 
arrester is one of the main components to protect the system from surge.  
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As we said earlier, that the electrical surge also can be generated from the system itself. Actually 
during switching operation there may be a chance of current chopping. If during normal 
operation, if electrical isolator is opened on load. Sudden open circuit is occurred in the system. 
In addition to these, the basic arc-quenching techniques of SF6 circuit breaker and vacuum circuit 
breaker may give rise to current chopping and multiple re-ignition sometimes. 
 
As we know that sudden current chopping give rise to the di/dt. [di/dt = rate of change of 
current with respect to time]. As the electrical load is generally inductive, there is a transient 
voltage, expressed by L(di/dt) where L is the inductance of load of system. This voltage is 
induced across the opening contacts, and travels towards load and reflects in similar manner of 
lightning impulse. Lightning arrestor or surge arrester are provided at the end of the transmission 
line to withstand the surge voltage. 
 
Generally oil field electrical power transformer, electrical switchgear, cables, electrical 
transmission lines, distribution lines are quite capable for withstanding these switching impulse 
voltages, as their insulation level is quite high to withstand these over voltages. But, 
generator, electric motor, dry type transformers and electric arc furnaces etc. cannot withstand 
large switching impulse voltages. As essentially this types of equipment do not have very high 
level of insulation. To protect this equipment from surges, lightning arrester is must. 
In electrical sub-station, arresters are mainly used at the entrance of any feeders and also they are 
used at both rides of electrical power transformers as transformer is also considered as inductive 
load and very costly equipment. 
 
 
In modern era, gap less ZnO or zinc oxide surge arresters are mainly used for surge protection. 
Let us discuss zinc oxide type gap less arresters. 
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6.1 Construction of Zinc Oxide Lightning Arrester 
 
This type of arrester comprises of numbers of solid zinc oxide disc. These discs are arranged one 
by one to form a cylindrical stack. The number of zinc oxide discs used per lightning 
arrester depends upon the voltage rating of the system. This stack is kept inside a cylindrical 
housing of polymer or porcelain. Then the stack is placed inside the housing and highly pressed 
by heavy spring load attached to end cap at top. The equipment connection terminal for line is 
projected from top cap and connection terminal for earth is projected from the bottom cap. 
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6.2 Working Principle of Zinc Oxide Lightning Arrester 
 
The normal operation is defined as condition when no surge is presented and the surge arrester is 
subjected to normal system voltage only. 
The zinc oxide has highly non-uniform current voltage (I – V) characteristics. This typical I-V 
characteristic makes zinc oxide very suitable for designing gap less zinc oxide lightning arrester 
for surge protection. The non linear resistance of the block is an inherent bulk property and 
consists of mainly zinc oxide (90 to 95%) with relatively small amounts of several additives of 
other metal oxide (5 to 10%) like alumina, antimony tri-oxide, bismuth oxide, cobalt oxide, 
zirconium etc. On a macroscopic scale the additives are almost homogeneously distributed 
throughout the arrester blocks. But the micro structures of the metal oxide block represent a 
network of series and parallel arrangements of highly doped zinc oxide (ZnO) grains separated 
by inter granular junctions. The non linear behavior is the super imposition of non linear 
characteristics of individual junctions. The current carrying capacity of the surge arrester block is 
proportional to the total cross-section of the block. 
The non linear resistance characteristics of ZnO block can be expressed as, 
 
 
 
Where, Ir and Vr are the reference current and voltage respectively of the lightning arrester 
or surge arrester block. The value of x is 30 to 40 in case of metal oxide block. For normal 
system, the voltage and current increase. For normal system, the voltage and current increases 
linearly, i.e. for increasing system voltage at this range, current is increased in linear 
proportionate. The current at this region of characteristics is in range of micro ampere. But 
beyond a certain voltage level, leakage current voltage level, leakage current starts increasing 
very rapidly it is of KA range. The voltage beyond which the current through the LA becomes 
such high, is referred as reference voltage and the current at reference voltage is known as 
reference current. Sudden draining of huge current through lightning arrester just beyond 
reference voltage level, prevents the system from transient over voltage stress. The voltage-
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current relation in a metal oxide block highly depends upon temperature. Metal oxide block has 
negative temperature co-efficient. That means with increase in temperature, resistance of 
the surge arrester decreases hence for some system voltage, the leakage current through the 
instrument increases with increase in temperature. 
As we know that, there would be a continuous leakage current through the LA. This 
leakage current generates heat. This generated heat should be dissipated properly otherwise the 
temperature of the LA may rise which further increases the leakage current. Because of this the 
proper thermal design of surge arrester housing plays an important role. There is a critical 
temperature depending upon the voltage rating of the metal oxide block beyond which joule heat 
generated in the block which joule heat generated in the block cannot be dissipated at required 
rate and which finally leads to thermal runaway of lightning arrester. 
Now we can understand that, the working principle of LA or surge arrester used for surge 
protection fully depends upon non linear V-I characteristics of metal oxide (ZnO) blocks inside 
the insulator housing of the arrester. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
7 SAFETY  CONSIDERATIONS: 
 
The philosophy employed in the safety design of a Westinghouse PWR is described as "defense 
in depth." Defense in depth ensures that a plant is designed, fabricated, constructed, and operated 
not only to be safe during normal operation but to account safely for the possibility of a spectrum 
of accidents. The plant has sophisticated safety systems and devices to guard against human 
error, equipment failures, and malfunctions taking into account such natural phenomena as 
Earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods. 
 
 
7.1 FIRST LEVEL OF DEFENSE 
 
The first level of defense addresses prevention of accidents through the design of the plant, 
including quality assurance, redundancy, separation, testing, and inspection. The plant is 
designed and built to operate as intended with a high degree of reliability. An example of how 
this first level of defense is applied is the design of the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure 
boundary. This same philosophy is utilized in the design of all safety-related systems, 
components, and structures. The components that comprise the RCS pressure boundary are 
required to be designed, fabricated, erected, and maintained to quality standards that reflect the 
importance of the safety function to be performed.  
 
The quality standards provide that the facility will be able to withstand, without loss of capability 
to protect the public, any additional forces that might be imposed by natural phenomena such as 
earthquakes, tornadoes, flooding conditions, winds, ice, or other local site factors.  
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The RCS pressure boundary is designed as Seismic Category 1 to provide a design margin to 
ensure the capability to perform its function under the conditions of the largest potential ground 
motion or other severe natural phenomena at the site.  
The RCS pressure boundary is capable of accommodating, without exceeding stress limits, the 
static and dynamic loads Imposed as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and design 
basis accidents.  
 
Credible transients which could cause pressure surges have been conservatively designed for by 
reactor protection system trips and by incorporation of relief and safety valves. In addition to 
these considerations, reduction of the probability of a rapidly propagating-type failure is 
accomplished through provisions for control over service temperature and irradiation effects. 
 
Close control and inspection over the selection of RCS pressure boundary materials and the 
fabrication of RCS pressure boundary components are exercised. Provisions are made for 
inspections, testing, and surveillance of critical areas of the pressure boundary to assess the 
structural and leak tight integrity during its service lifetime.  
Materials and components of the RCS are subjected to thorough nondestructive inspection prior 
to operation and a pre-operational hydro test is performed at 1.25 times design pressure. 
Provisions have been made for periodically inspecting, in situ, all areas of relatively high service 
factors.  
 
A reactor vessel material surveillance program is employed utilizing test samples which are 
placed in the reactor vessel and irradiated for designated periods of time, removed, and examined 
to determine changes in material properties. Also, RCS water chemistry control protects against 
corrosion which otherwise might reduce structural integrity during service lifetime. For pipes of 
the size, thickness, and material used in the RCS, detectable leakage will occur before a major 
rupture of the pipe. The RCS pressure boundary is conservatively designed to accommodate the 
system pressures and temperatures attained under all expected modes of plant operation, 
including anticipated transients and abnormal loading conditions, such as seismic conditions, and 
to maintain the stresses within appropriate stress limits. The RCS pressure boundary is protected 
from overpressure by means of pressure-relieving devices  
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7.2 SECOND LEVEL OF DEFENSE 
 
Despite the care taken at the first level of defense, it is prudently anticipated that some failures or 
operating errors could occur during the life of a plant with the potential for safety concern. 
Accordingly, a second level of defense is provided by means of reliable protections systems, 
designed to assure that expected occurrences and off-normal conditions will be detected and 
either arrested or accommodated safely.  
 
The requirements for these protection systems are based on a consideration of a spectrum of 
events that could lead to off-normal operations. Extensive testing programs are carried out to 
verify that the protective systems will function adequately.  
 
An example of a second level of defense system is the reactor protection system. The reactor 
protection system is activated by redundant and Independent instrument channels which translate 
their respective signals into redundant logic channels to automatically initiate a protective action. 
Conservative design practices, adequate safety margins, inspect ability, and redundant detection 
and actuating equipment are incorporated in protection systems to assure effectiveness and 
reliability.  
 
In addition, these systems are designed to be monitored and tested routinely to assure that they 
will operate reliably if and when required.  
 
The reactor protection system is designed to a high degree of reliability and testability to prevent 
or suppress conditions that could result in exceeding acceptable fuel limits. Protection and 
operational reliability is achieved by providing redundant instrument channels for each 
protective function.  
 
 These redundant channels are electrically isolated and physically separated from one another. 
The basic reactor operating design defines an allowable operating region of power, reactor 
coolant pressure, and reactor coolant temperature conditions. If the reactor protection system 
receives signals which are indicative of an approach to operating conditions outside of the 
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allowable operating region, the system actuates alarms, prevents control rod withdrawal, initiates 
load cutback, and/or opens the reactor trip breakers. 
  
The reactor protection system is designed to withstand the effects of the Design Basis 
Earthquake. Typical protection system equipment is subjected to type tests under simulated 
seismic accelerations to demonstrate its ability to perform its functions. Should a failure occur, 
the reactor protection system is designed to fail safe. To meet this requirement, each reactor trip 
channel is designed on the "de-energize to operate" principle; a loss of instrument power to that 
channel causes the system to go into its trip mode. To assure that the reactor protection system 
continues to function properly, the plant Technical Specifications require periodic surveillance, 
testing, and recalibration of each channel. 
 
 7.3 THIRD LEVEL OF DEFENSE 
 
The third level of defense is designed to add further margin by postulating, for design purposes, 
the occurrence of extremely unlikely circumstances. A hypothetical accident is assumed to occur 
and to progress beyond that which would be expected and which could occur only in the event of 
failures in both the first and second levels of defense. This scenario is studied in detail, with a 
deliberate compounding of combinations and sequences of events to make the safeguards 
performance objectives more demanding. 
 
 From an analysis of these Postulated events, a third level of features and equipment is designed 
and incorporated into the plant to safely control such an unlikely event and to protect the public 
health and safety.  
 
For example, the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)* is provided to mitigate the 
consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) even though the first level of defense makes 
such an occurrence highly unlikely. The ECCS is designed to comply with U.S. NRC General 
Design Criteria. The many conservative steps required by these requirements ensures the ECCS a 
very high probability of successful operations, if and when required. The primary function of the 
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ECCS is to deliver emergency core cooling in the event that the primary coolant system is 
accidentally depressurized (i.e., a LOCA).  
 
The ECCS limits the fuel cladding temperature below the level allowed by U.S. NRC 
Regulations so that the core will remain intact and in place, with its essential heat transfer 
geometry preserved. This protection is afforded for all pipe break sizes up to and including a 
postulated circumferential rupture and separation of a reactor coolant pipe. The ECCS employs a 
passive system of accumulators, in addition to independent high pressure and low-pressure 
pumping systems.  
 
The passive system of accumulators does not require any external signals or source of power for 
its operation. An accumulator is connected to each of the cold leg pipes of the reactor coolant 
system and provides for the short-term cooling requirements for a large pipe break by injecting 
borated water when RCS pressure falls below accumulator pressure. 
 
 Two independent high pressure pumping systems, each capable of providing the required 
cooling, are provided for small break protection and to maintain water inventory after the 
accumulators have discharged following a large break LOCA. Two independent low-pressure 
pumping systems are provided, each capable of fulfilling long-term cooling requirements. The 
ECCS is designed with sufficient redundancy and diversity of components such that the failure 
of any single active component does not prevent the ECCS from fulfilling its mission. For 
example, the cooling capability of the ECCS would be sufficient to maintain the fuel cladding 
temperatures below allowable limits even if the failure of any single active component occurred 
during a major LOCA. Also, no operator action is required to maintain the ECCS capability in 
the event of a single failure in the system.  
 
 
To meet other criteria, additional conservative actions have been taken concerning the ECCS. 
The ECCS and its components have been designed, fabricated, constructed, tested, and inspected 
under a strict and detailed Quality Assurance Program commensurate with the importance of its 
safety function.  
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The ECCS is designed to applicable codes to provide safety margins to protect against dynamic 
effects. The ECCS equipment has also been designed and fabricated so that it will function 
without failure under the worst conditions of post-accident temperature, pressure, radiation, and 
humidity conditions for the length of time required.  
 
It also requires that a reliable power supply be provided for ECCS operation. This power supply 
is provided through independent connections to the system grid and a redundant source of 
emergency power from independent diesel generators installed on site. Sufficient power for 
operation of the ECCS is provided even with the failure of a single active component, including 
a diesel generator in each of these separate and independent power systems.  
 
The ECCS is subjected to a thorough inspection and testing program conforming to U.S. NRC 
requirements. ECCS components are tested both in the manufacturer's shop and after installation 
to demonstrate performance and reliability.  
 
The ECCS design permits periodic testing of active components for operability and required 
functional performance as required by Technical Specifications. The ECCS delivery capability 
can be tested periodically by recirculation of water to the refueling water storage tank.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
8 PWR nuclear Power Plant Station Black Out 
 
 
8.1 Passive Safety System for Station Black Out 
 
 AC power is not required for safe shutdown   
 
 
 Core cooling provided for long-term safe shutdown state: 
72 hours without operator action 
 
 
 Pressurized water Reactor is designed so that core stays inside of the reactor vessel 
During a severe accidents 
 
 
 After 72 hours with some operator actions to transfer water, core cooling and 
containment cooling are maintained indefinitely  
 
 
 
 PWR spent fuel pool cooling system is capable of providing cooling for spent reactor fuel 
indefinitely, with minimal need  for operator action  
 
 Diagram of passive safety system of PWR Reactor is shown in fig. A 
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Fig. A 
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8.2 Timeline for Station Blackout 
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8.2.1 Initially at zero time station blackout occurs: 
 
Loss of offsite power occurs at the same time standby diesel generator fails to start, 
resulting in station blackout 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.B 
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8.2.2 1 Minute: 
 
Control rods are inserted in reactor core, terminating the fission process and shutting 
down the reactor. 
 
Reactor core continues to provide decay heat that needs to be removed by cooling. 
Active pumping of cooling water through the spent fuel stops due to loss of power. 
 
The used fuel in spent fuel pool continues to transfer decay heat to the pool of water, 
causing the water to heat up 
 
 
8.2.3 2 Minutes: 
 
The steam generator water level decreases and activates the Passive Core Cooling 
System. 
 
Natural circulation flow started automatically because density difference between the 
cold reactor coolant in the passive heat exchanger and hot fuel in the reactor core. 
 
 
Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a large Nuclear Power Plant 
 
AIKTC Page 92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.C 
Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a large Nuclear Power Plant 
 
AIKTC Page 93 
 
8.2.3 2 Hours: 
Reactor decay heat has decreased to one percent of full power. 
 
8.2.4 3 Hours: 
 
The cooling water in spent fuel begins to boil. 
Decay heat from spent fuel is transferred from the water to the steam. 
Any Evaporated water is replaced from supply located in the adjacent cask washdown pit 
which is gravity-fed to spent fuel pool. 
 
 
 Fig.D 
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8.2.5 5 Hours: 
 
The passive heat exchanger has transferred enough decay from the reactor to the in-
containment tank that the water inside the in-containment tank begins to boil. 
Steam produced inside of containment vessel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.E 
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8.2.6 6 Hours: 
The instrumentation monitoring system detects the need for containment cooling and 
open valves to start cooling water flow 
Water in the containment cooling tank, located on the roof of shield building, 
automatically drains through gravity and cools the top and sides of the steel containment 
vessel. 
 
8.2.7 6 to  hours: 
The steam generated by in-containment tank transfers the decay heat to the steel of the 
containment vessel through condensation of the steam. 
The water cooling the steel containment vessel removes decay heat through evaporation 
Natural convection airflow passing through the shield building promotes the water coolin 
of containment. 
 
 
8.2.8 >7 hours: 
As the steam from the in-containment tank transfer decay heat to the steel containment 
vessel, steam condense back to water and is redirected back to in-containment tank for 
continued use in removing decay heat  from the reactor core. 
This cooling cycle continued indefinitely. 
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Fig.F 
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8.2.9 36 Hours (Safe Shutdown Condition ): 
 
The reactor has reached safe shutdown condition without operator action and without use 
of active AC power sources, using passive cooling.  
Reactor decay heat generation one half of one percent of full power. 
 
 
 
8.2.10 72 Hours: 
The operator starts the ancillary diesel generators to provide power for post accident 
monitoring, water making pumps and main control room lightning. 
Water makeup pumps are used to transfer water from ancillary water storage tank to 
passive containment cooling water storage tank to maintain water cooling of containment. 
These pumps also transfer water from ancillary storage tank to the spent fuel pool to 
continue its cooling of the spent fuel. 
Fig.G 
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8.2.11 7  Days: 
 
Diesel fuel is replenished in the ancillary generators if power is not restored to the site, 
To maintain ancillary functions. 
Water from other available sources, including on site tank sea water, or other off site 
water supplies is transferred to either ancillary storage water tank or safety related 
makeup water flanged connection in the yard. 
Portable equipment could be used to continue cooling of the containment vessel and the 
spent fuel. 
 Operator can continue transfer water to maintain containment and spent fuel cooling 
indefinitely. 
Reactor decay heat is slightly more than one third of one percent of full power. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. H 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
9 Fault Calculations 
 
9.1 Symmetrical fault calculation on main Generator 
 
9.1.2 
Main generator  
 
1370 MVA, Output voltage = 2400 V to 26000V 
 
Frequency = 50Hz, p.f. = 0.9, Speed= 1500 rpm  
 
Generator is connected to 11.68KV bus , p.u reactance = 0.1 (Assumed) 
 
Taking  SBase = 1400 MVA  
 
Zp.u. =0.1pu 
 
For,  
1370 → 8 pu 
1400→ 8.17 pu 
 
Fault MVA = ஻௔௦௘	ெ௏஺
Zp.u.  
    = 1400/ 8.17 
  = 171.35 MVA 
 
√3 VLISC =171.35 MVA 
 
Analysis of Electric Power Distribution System of a large Nuclear Power Plant 
 
AIKTC Page 100 
 
ISC      =  
171.35
√3×11.8	  
 
ISC           = 8.3842 K 
       =  IF 
 
9.1.3  
An 11.8KV bus bar is fed from three synchronous generators having  the following ratings and 
reactances   : 
 20 MVA,X1’  =0.08 PU 
 60 MVA,X2’  =0.1PU 
 20 MVA,X3’  =0.09PU 
A three phase symmetrical fault occurs on the bus bar. Resistance may be neglected. The voltage 
base is 11.8KV & VA base is 60 MVA. 
                 Find: 
1. Fault MVA 
2. Fault current  
 
SOLUTION:                  
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                                  VBASE = 18 KV 
   SBASE = 60 MVA 
1. FAULT MVA  
FAULT MVA= (base MVA / ZPU) 
ZPU for generator 1 is 0.08PU. 
ZPU for generator of 60 MVA is: (60*0.08/20) = 0.24PU. 
ZPU for generator 2 is 0.1PU. 
ZPU for generator 3 is: (60*0.09/20) = 0.27PU. 
 
 
 
Therefore, ZEQ = 1/ (Z1-1+Z2-1+Z3-1) 
      =   1/ (0.24-1+0.1-1+0.27-1)  
                = 0.056PU. 
Their fore, FAULT MVA= (60 MVA/0.056) 
    = 1071.42 MVA. 
2. FAULT CURENT  
            FAULT CURENT = (fault MVA / √3* base KV) 
                    ISC   = (1071.42 / √3* 11.8K) 
                                        ISC       =   52.42KA. 
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9.2 Unsymmetrical Fault Calculation  
                            
 
 
 Group of  identical synchronous motors is connected through  a  Transformers. 
 Motors are rated  600V operate at 89.5% efficiency at full load and unity power factor 
and rated voltage . 
 The sum of the output rating is 4476 KW (6000HP). The reactance in per unit of each 
motor based on its input kilovolt ampere rating are Xd” =X1= 0.20 , X2= 0.2, X0= 0.04, 
each motor is grounded through reactance of 0.02 per unit. 
 Motors are connected to the 4.16 KV bus through a transformer bank composed of three 
single phase units each of which is rated 2400/ 600V , 2500KVa . The 600V windings  
are in ∆ connected and 2400 in Y connection . Leakage reactance of each transformer is 
10%= 0.1 pu 
  Generator rated 7500 KVA. 416 KV,  with reactance Xd”=X2= 0.1 pu, X0= 0.05 pu and 
Xn= 0.05 pu 
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FAULT Condition  
 
Each of initial motors is supplying an equal share of a total load 3730 KW(5000HP) and is 
operating at rated voltage 85 % of power factor log and 88% efficiency when single line to 
ground Fault occurs on the low voltage side of the transformer bank  
 
Assuming group of motors as a single unit 
The rating of the equivalent generator as base 7500KVA, 4.16 KV os system Bus  
Since,  
√3 x2400 = 4.16KV  &    3x2500= 7500 KVA (For 3 phase transformer) 
3 phase rating of Transformer is 7500KVA , 4160 Y/∆  
Therefore Base for motor circuit is 7500 KVA , 600V, 
Therefore KVA rating of single motor can be given by 
 
KVA of  1st motor = 
	η%×	p.f 
   = 4476/ (0.895x 1) 
   = 5000 KVA 
 
Reactances of motor  are given as  
Xd”=  X1 = 0.20,  X0= 0.04 
 
For  7500 KVA p.u reactance will be  
 
Xd’’ =X1= X2 = ( 0.2x7500)/ 5000 = 0.3 p.u 
X0 = (0.04x7500)/ 5000= 0.06 p.u  
 
 In zero Sequence network the reactance between neutral ang ground of equivalent motor is  
Xn = 0.02 
 
For 5000 KVA →  3Xn = 3 x 0.02 
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Taking base as 7500 KVA then 
3Xn = 3x 0.02x (7500/5000) = 0.09 p.u. 
For equivalent generator the reactance from neutral to ground 
Xn = 0.05 
3Xn= 3 x 0.05 = 0.15 
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Sequence networks  
                       
 
 Motors are operated at rated voltage equal to the base voltage of the motor, the prefault voltage 
of phase ‘a’ at the fault bus 1, we assume  
Vf =1 p.u 
 
Base current for motor circuit is  
√3 VpIp= 7500KVA  
 
Ip = 7500K/( √3x600) 
    ≈ 7217 A 
I base = 7217 A 
 
Now motor current during fault is  
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 During fault in KW = 3730 KW 
 
KVA rating will be = 3730K/ (0.88x 0.85 ) 
 
Current will be =√3 VpIp= KVA 
  I = 3730/( √3 x 600 x 0.88 x 0.85) 
  I  ≈  4798 A 
Current drawn by the motor through line ‘a’ before fault occurs is  I/Ibase  
  =4798/(7217 < cos-10.85) 
  ≈ 0.665< -31.8˚ 
      Ipf = 0.5646-j0.350 p.u 
 
→ If prefault current is neglected, Eg
’’ & Em’’ are equal to 1<0˚ p.u 
        Thevenin impedances for each of sequence network as follows  
 
For positive sequence  
Z1(1)= 
j(0.1ା	0.1)x	j	0.3	
j(0.1ା	0.1)ାj	0.3	 
      ≈  j 0.12 p.u 
 
For negative sequence  
Z11(2)  =   
j(0.1ା	0.1)x	j	0.3	
j(0.1ା	0.1)ାj	0.3	 
               ≈  j 0.12 p.u 
 
 For Zero sequence network  
Z11(0)= j 0.06 +j0.09  
          
=j 0.15 
 
Fault current in the series connection of the sequence network is 
Ifa’=
1
0.12ା 0.12ା
0.15   
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     = 1 / j0.39 = -j2.56 
Ifa1= Ifa2= Ifa0= -j2.56 
Current in fault = 3 Ifa0= -j7.692 
 
In the positive sequence network the portion of Ifa(1) flowing toward P from the transformer is 
found cy current division  
= ି 2.564× 0.3
0.5  = -j 1.538 p.u 
 
Portion of Ifa flowing through motor toward P 
= ି 2.564× 0.2
0.5  = -j 1.026p.u 
 
Similarly in case of motor as reactance’s are same Ifa(2)  from transformer to p is –j1.538 and  Ifa(2)   
from motor to P is –j 1.026 and in negative sequence network current is shown in figure , which 
is –j2.54 toward P 
To P from transformer in p.u 
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As transformer winding Y(grounded )-∆ connected  
 
Ia(1)= Ia(1) < 30˚ and Ia(2)= Ia(2) < -30˚ 
Ia(1)= -j1.538 < 30˚ = 0.769- j1.332 
Ia(2)  = -j1.538 <-30˚= -0.769-j1.332 
 
From fig Ia(0) =0 in the zero sequence network. Since, there are no zero sequence on high voltage 
side of transformer 
 
Ia= Ia(1)+ Ia(2) 
   = -j2.664 p.u 
 
IB(1)= a2 Ia(1)=(1<240˚) 
=-1.538 
 
IB(2)= a IA(2)= 1.538 
 
IB= -1.538+1.538 = 0 
 
Ic(1)= a Ia(1)= (1< 120)(1.538< -60˚) 
      = 0.769+j1.332 
 
IC(2)= a2 Ia(2) 
= -0.769+j1.332 
 
IC = j 2.664 
 
Now by calculating base currents on the two sides of the transformer , we can convert the above 
per unit currents to amperes  
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Base current for motor circuit is calculated previously and its vlue is 7217 A 
 
Base current for high voltage side is  
 = 7500
√3	×	4160	 
         = 1041 A 
 
Fault current is –j7.692  
 
Current in fault  = IBase  ×	Ipu 
   = 7217 × 7.692  
 
3IFa 0 = 55,500 A 
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